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ON THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL POWER

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POWER is one of the key concepts in the great Western tradition of thought about political phenomena. It is at the same time a concept on which, in spite of its long history, there is, on analytical levels, a notable lack of agreement both about its specific definition, and about many features of the conceptual context in which it should be placed. There is, however, a core complex of its meaning, having to do with the capacity of persons or collectivities "to get things done" effectively, in particular when their goals are obstructed by some kind of human resistance or opposition. The problem of coping with resistance then leads into the question of the role of coercive measures, including the use of physical force, and the relation of coercion to the voluntary and consensual aspects of power systems.

The aim of this paper is to attempt to clarify this complex of meanings and relations by placing the concept of power in the context of a general conceptual scheme for the analysis of large-scale and complex social systems, that is of societies. In doing so I speak as a sociologist rather than as a political scientist, but as one who believes that the interconnections of the principal social disciplines, including not only these two, but especially their relations to economics as well, are so close that on matters of general theory of this sort they cannot safely be treated in isolation; their interrelations must be made explicit and systematic. As a sociologist, I thus treat a central concept of political theory by selecting among the elements which have figured prominently in political theory in terms of their fit with and significance for the general theoretical analysis of society as a whole.

There are three principal contexts in which it seems to me that the difficulties of the concept of power, as treated in the literature of the last generation, come to a head. The first of these concerns its conceptual diffuseness, the tendency, in the tradition of Hobbes, to treat power as simply the generalized capacity to attain ends or goals in social relations, independently of the media em-

ployed or of the status of "authorization" to make decisions or impose obligations.¹

The effect of this diffuseness, as I call it, is to treat "influence" and sometimes money, as well as coercion in various aspects, as "forms" of power, thereby making it logically impossible to treat power as a *specific* mechanism operating to bring about changes in the action of other units, individual or collective, in the processes of social interaction. The latter is the line of thought I wish to pursue.

Secondly, there is the problem of the relation between the coercive and the consensual aspects. I am not aware of any treatment in the literature which presents a satisfactory solution of this problem. A major tendency is to hold that somehow "in the last analysis" power comes down to one or the other, i.e., to "rest on" command of coercive sanctions, *or* on consensus and the will to voluntary cooperation. If going to one or the other polar solution seems to be unacceptable, a way out, taken for example by Friedrich, is to speak of each of these as different "forms" of power. I shall propose a solution which maintains that both aspects are essential, but that neither of the above two ways of relating them is satisfactory, namely subordinating either one to the other or treating them as discrete "forms."

Finally the third problem is what, since the Theory of Games, has widely come to be called the "zero-sum" problem. The dominant tendency in the literature, for example in Lasswell and C. Wright Mills, is to maintain explicitly or implicitly that power is a zero-sum phenomenon,

¹ Thus E. C. Banfield, *Political Influence* (New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 348, speaks of control as the ability to cause another to give or withhold action, and power as the ability to establish control over another. Similarly Robert Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Scientist* 2 (July, 1957), says that "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do." C. J. Friedrich takes a similar position in his forthcoming book, the tentative title of which is "Man and his Government."

which is to say that there is a fixed "quantity" of power in any relational system and hence any gain of power on the part of *A* must by definition occur by diminishing the power at the disposal of other units, *B*, *C*, *D*. . . . There are, of course, restricted contexts in which this condition holds, but I shall argue that it does not hold for total systems of a sufficient level of complexity.

SOME GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS

The initial assumption is that, within the conception of society as a system, there is an essential parallelism in theoretical structure between the conceptual schemes appropriate for the analysis of the economic and the political aspects of societies. There are four respects in which I wish to attempt to work out and build on this parallel, showing at the same time the crucial substantive differences between the two fields.

First "political theory" as here interpreted, which is not simply to be identified with the meaning given the term by many political scientists, is thought of as an abstract analytical scheme in the same sense in which economic theory is abstract and analytical. It is not the conceptual interpretation of any concretely complete category of social phenomena, quite definitely not those of government, though government is the area in which the political element comes nearest to having clear primacy over others. Political theory thus conceived is a conceptual scheme which deals with a restricted set of primary variables and their interrelations, which are to be found operating in all concrete parts of social systems. These variables are, however, subject to parametric conditions which constitute the values of other variables operating in the larger system which constitutes the society.

Secondly, following on this, I assume that the empirical system to which political theory in this sense applies is an analytically defined, a "functional" subsystem of a society, not for example a concrete type of collectivity. The conception of the economy of a society is relatively well defined.² I should propose the conception of the *polity* as the parallel empirical system of direct relevance to political theory as here advanced. The polity of a given society is composed of the ways in which the relevant components of the

total system are organized with reference to one of its fundamental functions, namely effective collective action in the attainment of the goals of collectivities. Goal-attainment in this sense is the establishment of a satisfactory relation between a collectivity and certain objects in its environment which include both other collectivities and categories of personalities, e.g. "citizens." A total society must in these terms be conceived, in one of its main aspects, as a collectivity, but it is also composed of an immense variety of subcollectivities, many of which are parts not only of this society but of others.³

A collectivity, seen in these terms, is thus clearly not a concrete "group" but the term refers to groups, i.e. systematically related pluralities of persons, seen in the perspective of their interests in and capacities for effective collective action. The political process then is the process by which the necessary organization is built up and operated, the goals of action are determined and the resources requisite to it are mobilized.

These two parallels to economic theory can be extended to still a third. The parallel to collective action in the political case is, for the economic, production. This conception in turn must be understood in relation to three main operative contexts. The first is adjustment to the conditions of "demand" which are conceived to be external to the economy itself, to be located in the "consumers" of the economic process. Secondly, resources must be mobilized, also from the environment of the economy, the famous factors of production. Thirdly, the internal economic process is conceived as creatively combinatorial; it is, by the "combination" of factors of production in the light of the utility of outputs, a process of creating more valuable facilities to meet the needs of consuming units than would be available to them without this combinatorial process. I wish most definitely to postulate that the logic of "value added" applies to the political sphere in the present sense.⁴

³ E.g. the American medical profession is part of American society, but also it is part of a wider medical profession which transcends this particular society, to some extent as collectivity. Interpenetration in membership is thus a feature of the relations among collectivities.

⁴ For discussions of the conception of "valued-added" in spheres of application broader than the economic alone, cf. Neil J. Smelser, *Social Change in the Industrial Revolution* (Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959), chapter II, pp. 7-20, and Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), chapter II, pp. 23-47.

² Cf. Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelser, *Economy and Society* (Illinois, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1956), chapter I, for a discussion of this conception.

In the political case, however, the value reference is not to utility in the economic sense but to effectiveness, very precisely, I think in the sense used by C. I. Barnard.⁵ For the limited purposes of political analysis as such the givenness of the goal-demands of interest groups serves as the same order of factor in relation to the political system as has the corresponding givenness of consumers' wants for purposes of economic analysis—and of course the same order of qualifications on the empirical adequacy of such postulates.

Finally, fourth, political analysis as here conceived is parallel to economic in the sense that a central place in it is occupied by a generalized medium involved in the political interaction process, which is also a "measure" of the relevant values. I conceive power as such a generalized medium in a sense directly parallel in logical structure, though very different substantively, to money as the generalized medium of the economic process. It is essentially this conception of power as a generalized medium parallel to money which will, in the theoretical context sketched above, provide the thread for guiding the following analysis through the types of historic difficulty with reference to which the paper began.

THE OUTPUTS OF POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE FACTORS OF EFFECTIVENESS

The logic of the combinatorial process which I hold to be common to economic theory and the type of political theory advanced here, involves a paradigm of inputs and outputs and their relations. Again we will hold that the logic is strictly parallel to the economic case, i.e. that there should be a set of political categories strictly parallel to those of the factors of production (inputs) on the one hand, the shares of income (outputs) on the other.

In the economic case, with the exception of land, the remaining three factors must be regarded as inputs from the other three cognate functional subsystems of the society, labor from what we call the "pattern-maintenance" system, capital from the polity and organization, in the sense of Alfred Marshall, from the integrative system.⁶ Furthermore, it becomes clear that land is not, as a factor of production, simply the physical resource, but

⁵ C. I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1938), chapter V, pp. 46-64.

⁶ On the rationale of these attributions, see *Economy and Society*, *op. cit.*, chapter II.

essentially the commitment, in value terms, of any resources to economic production in the system independent of price.

In the political case, similarly the equivalent of land is the commitment of resources to effective collective action, independent of any specifiable "pay-off" for the unit which controls them.⁷ Parallel to labor is the demands or "need" for collective action as manifested in the "public" which in some sense is the constituency of the leadership of the collectivity in question—a conception which is relatively clear for the governmental or other electoral association, but needs clarification in other connections. Parallel to capital is the control of some part of the productivity of the economy for the goals of the collectivity, in a sufficiently developed economy through financial resources at the disposal of the collectivity, acquired by earnings, gift, or taxation. Finally, parallel to organization is the legitimation of the authority under which collective decisions are taken.

It is most important to note that none of these categories of input is conceived as a form of power. In so far as they involve media, it is the media rooted in contiguous functional systems, not power as that central to the polity—e.g. control of productivity may operate through money, and constituents' demands through what I call "influence." Power then is the *means* of acquiring control of the factors in effectiveness; it is not itself one of these factors, any more than in the economic case money is a factor of production; to suppose it was, was the ancient mercantilist fallacy.

Though the analytical context in which they are placed is perhaps unfamiliar in the light of traditional political analysis, I hope it is clear that the actual categories used are well established, though there remain a number of problems of exact definition. Thus control of productivity through financing of collective action is very familiar, and the concept of "demands" in the sense of what constituents want and press for, is also very familiar.⁸ The concept legitimation is used in essentially the same sense in which I think Max Weber used it in a political context.⁹

⁷ "Pay-off" may be a deciding factor in choice between particular contexts of use, but not as to whether the resource shall be devoted to collective effectiveness at all.

⁸ I have in fact adopted the term "demands" from the usage of David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics* 9(1957): 383-400.

⁹ Cf. Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York, Oxford University Press,

The problem of what corresponds, for the political case, to the economist's "shares of income" is not very difficult, once the essential distinction, a very old one in economic tradition, between monetary and "real" income is clearly taken into account. Our concern is with the "real" outputs of the political process—the analogue of the monetary here is output of power.

There is one, to us critically important revision of the traditional economic treatment of outputs which must be made, namely the bracketing together of "goods and services," which then would be treated as outputs to the household as, in our technical terms, a part of the "pattern-maintenance" system. The present position is that goods, i.e., more precisely property rights in the physical objects of possession, belong in this category, but that "services," the commitment of human role-performances to an "employer," or contracting agent constitute an output, not to the household, but to the polity, the type case (though not the only one) being an employing organization in which the role-incumbent commits himself to performance of an occupational role, a job,¹⁰ as a contribution to the effective functioning of the collectivity.

There is, from this consideration, a conclusion which is somewhat surprising to economists, namely that service is, in the economic sense the "real" counterpart of interest as monetary income from the use of funds. What we suggest is that the political control of productivity makes it possible, through combinatorial gains in the political context, to produce a surplus above the monetary funds committed, by virtue of which under specified conditions a premium can be paid at the monetary level which, though a result of the combinatorial process as a whole, is most directly related to the output of available services as an economic phenomenon, i.e. as a "fluid resource." Seen a little differently, it becomes necessary to make a clear distinction between labor as a factor of production in the economic sense and service as an output of the economic process which is utilized in a political context, that is one of organizational or collective effectiveness.

Service, however, is not a "factor" in effective-

ness, in the sense in which labor is a factor of production, precisely because it is a category of power. It is the point at which the economic utility of the human factor is matched with its potential contribution to effective collective action. Since the consumer of services is in principle the employing collectivity, it is its effectiveness for collective goals, not its capacity to satisfy the "wants" of individuals, which is the vantage point from which the utility of the service is derived. The output of power which matches the input of services to the polity, I interpret to be the "opportunity for effectiveness" which employment confers on those employed or contract offers to partners. Capital in the economic sense is one form of this opportunity for effectiveness which is derived from providing, for certain types of performances, a framework of effective organization.¹¹

The second, particularly important context of "real" output of the political process is the category which, in accord with much tradition, I should like to call capacity to assume leadership responsibility. This, as a category of "real" output also is not a form of power, but this time of influence.¹² This is an output not to the economy but to what I shall call the integrative system, which in its relevance to the present context is in the first instance the sector of the "public" which can be looked on as the "constituencies" of the collective processes under consideration. It is the group structure of the society looked at in terms of their structured interests in particular modes of effective collective action by particular collectivities. It is only through effective organization that genuine responsibility can be taken, hence the implementation of such interest demands responsibility for collective effectiveness.¹³

¹¹ In the cases treated as typical for economic analysis the collective element in capital is delegated through the *bindingness* of the contracts of loan of financial resources. To us this is a special case, employment being another, of the binding obligation assumed by an organization, whether it employs or loans, by virtue of which the recipient can be more effective than would otherwise be the case. It is not possible to go further into these complex problems here, but they will, perhaps, be somewhat illuminated by the later discussion of the place of the concept of bindingness in the theory of power.

¹² See my paper "On the Concept of Influence," to be published in the *Public Opinion Quarterly* 27 (Spring, 1963).

¹³ Here again Barnard's usage of the concept of responsibility seems to me the appropriate one. See Barnard, *op. cit.*

1947), p. 124. Translation by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons; edited by Talcott Parsons.

¹⁰ The cases of services concretely rendered to a household will be considered as a limiting case where the roles of consumer and employer have not become differentiated from each other.

Again it should be made quite clear that leadership responsibility is not here conceived as an output of power, though many political theorists (e.g. Friedrich) treat both leadership and, more broadly influence, as "forms" of power. The power category which regulates the output of leadership influence takes this form on the one side of binding policy decisions of the collectivity, on the other of political support from the constituency, in the type case through franchise. Policy decisions we would treat as a factor in integration of the system, not as a "consumable" output of the political process.¹⁴

Finally, a few words need to be said about what I have called the combinatorial process itself. It is of course assumed in economic theory that the "structures" of the factors of production on the one hand, the "demand system" for real outputs on the other hand, are independent of each other. "Utility" of outputs can only be enhanced, to say nothing of maximized, by processes of transformation of the factors in the direction of providing what is wanted as distinguished from what merely is available. The decision-making aspect of this transformative process, what is to be produced, how much and how offered for consumption, is what is meant by economic production, whereas the physical processes are not economic but "technological"; they are controlled by economic considerations, but are not themselves in an analytical sense economic.

The consequence of successful adaptation of available resources to the want or demand system is an increment in the value of the resource-stock conceived in terms of utility as a type of value. But this means recombination of the components of the resource-stock in order to adapt them to the various uses in question.

The same logic applies to the combinatorial process in the political sphere. Here the resources are not land, labor, capital, and organization, but valuation of effectiveness, control of productivity, structured demands and the patterning of legitimation. The "wants" are not for consumption in the economic sense, but for the solution of "interest" problems in the system, including both

competitive problems in the allocative sense and conflict problems, as well as problems of enhancement of the total effectiveness of the system of collective organization. In this case also the "structure" of the available resources may not be assumed spontaneously to match the structure of the system of interest-demands. The increment of effectiveness in demand-satisfaction through the political process is, as in the economic case, arrived at through combinatorial decision-processes. The organizational "technology" involved is not in the analytical sense political. The demand-reference is not to discrete units of the system conceived in abstraction from the system as a whole—the "individual" consumer of the economist—but to the problem of the share of benefits and burdens to be allocated to subsystems of various orders. The "consumption" reference is to the interest-unit's place in the allocative system rather than to the independent merits of particular "needs."

THE CONCEPT OF POWER

The above may seem a highly elaborate setting in which to place the formal introduction of the main subject of the paper, namely the concept of power. Condensed and cryptic as the exposition may have been, however, understanding of its main structure is an essential basis for the special way in which it will be proposed to combine the elements which have played a crucial part in the main intellectual traditions dealing with the problems of power.

Power is here conceived as a circulating medium, analogous to money, within what is called the political system, but notably over its boundaries into all three of the other neighboring functional subsystems of a society (as I conceive them), the economic, integrative, and pattern-maintenance systems. Specification of the properties of power can best be approached through an attempt to delineate very briefly the relevant properties of money as such a medium in the economy.

Money is, as the classical economists said, both a medium of exchange and a "measure of value." It is symbolic in that, though measuring and thus "standing for" economic value or utility, it does not itself possess utility in the primary consumption sense—it has no "value in use" but only "in exchange," i.e. for possession of things having utility. The use of money is thus a mode of com-

¹⁴In order not to complicate things too much, I shall not enter into problem of the interchange system involving legitimation here. See my paper "Authority, Legitimation, and Political Process," in *Nomos 1*, reprinted as chapter V of my *Structure and Process in Modern Societies* (Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1960), chapter V, pp. 170-198.

munication of offers, on the one hand to purchase, on the other to sell, things of utility, with and for money. It becomes an essential medium only when exchange is neither ascriptive, as exchange of gifts between assigned categories of kin, nor takes place on a basis of barter, one item of commodity or service directly for another.

In exchange for its lack of direct utility money gives the recipient four important degrees of freedom in his participation in the total exchange system. (1) He is free to spend his money for any item or combination of items available on the market which he can afford, (2) he is free to shop around among alternative sources of supply for desired items, (3) he can choose his own time to purchase, and (4) he is free to consider terms which, because of freedom of time and source he can accept or reject or attempt to influence in the particular case. By contrast, in the case of barter, the negotiator is bound to what his particular partner has or wants in relation to what he has and will part with at the particular time. The other side of the gain in degrees of freedom is of course the risk involved in the probabilities of the acceptance of money by others and of the stability of its value.

Primitive money is a medium which is still very close to a commodity, the commonest case being precious metal, and many still feel that the value of money is "really" grounded in the commodity value of the metallic base. On this base, however, there is, in developed monetary systems, erected a complex structure of credit instruments, so that only a tiny fraction of actual transactions is conducted in terms of the metal—it becomes a "reserve" available for certain contingencies, and is actually used mainly in the settlement of international balances. I shall discuss the nature of credit further in another connection later. For the moment suffice it to say that, however important in certain contingencies the availability of metallic reserves may be, no modern monetary system operates primarily with metal as the actual medium, but uses "valueless" money. Moreover, the acceptance of this "valueless" money rests on a certain institutionalized confidence in the monetary system. If the security of monetary commitments rested only on their convertibility into metal, then the overwhelming majority of them would be worthless, for the simple reason that the total quantity of metal is far too small to redeem more than a few.

One final point is that money is "good," i.e.

works as a medium, only within a relatively defined network of market relationships which to be sure now has become world-wide, but the maintenance of which requires special measures to maintain mutual convertibility of national currencies. Such a system is on the one hand a range of exchange-potential within which money may be spent, but on the other hand, one within which certain conditions affecting the protection and management of the unit are maintained, both by law and by responsible agencies under the law.

The first focus of the concept of an institutionalized power system is, analogously, a relational system within which certain categories of commitments and obligations, ascriptive or voluntarily assumed—e.g. by contract—are treated as binding, i.e. under normatively defined conditions their fulfillment may be insisted upon by the appropriate role-reciprocal agencies. Furthermore, in case of actual or threatened resistance to "compliance," i.e. to fulfillment of such obligations when invoked, they will be "enforced" by the threat or actual imposition of situational negative sanctions, in the former case having the function of deterrence, in the latter of punishment. These are events in the situation of the actor of reference which intentionally alter his situation (or threaten to) to his disadvantage, whatever in specific content these alterations may be.

Power then is generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by units in a system of collective organization when the obligations are legitimized with reference to their bearing on collective goals and where in case of recalcitrance there is a presumption of enforcement by negative situational sanctions—whatever the actual agency of that enforcement.

It will be noted that I have used the conceptions of generalization and of legitimation in defining power. Securing possession of an object of utility by bartering another object for it is not a monetary transaction. Similarly, by my definition, securing compliance with a wish, whether it be defined as an obligation of the object or not, simply by threat of superior force, is not an exercise of power. I am well aware that most political theorists would draw the line differently and classify this as power (e.g. Dahl's definition), but I wish to stick to my chosen line and explore its implications. The capacity to secure compliance must, if it is to be called power in my sense, be generalized and not solely a function of one particular sanctioning act which the user is in a posi-

tion to impose,¹⁵ and the medium used must be "symbolic."

Secondly, I have spoken of power as involving legitimation. This is, in the present context, the necessary consequence of conceiving power as "symbolic," which therefore, if it is exchanged for something intrinsically valuable for collective effectiveness, namely compliance with an obligation, leaves the recipient, the performer of the obligation, with "nothing of value." This is to say, that he has "nothing" but a set of expectations, namely that in other contexts and on other occasions, he can invoke certain obligations of the part of other units. Legitimation is therefore, in power systems, the factor which is parallel to confidence in mutual acceptability and stability of the monetary unit in monetary systems.

The two criteria are connected in that questioning the legitimacy of the possession and use of power leads to resort to progressively more "secure" means of gaining compliance. These must be progressively more effective "intrinsically," hence more tailored to the particular situations of the objects and less general. Furthermore in so far as they are intrinsically effective, legitimacy becomes a progressively less important factor of their effectiveness—at the end of this series lies resort, first to various types of coercion, eventually to the use of force as the most intrinsically effective of all means of coercion.¹⁶

I should like now to attempt to place both money and power in the context of a more general paradigm, which is an analytical classification of ways in which, in the processes of social interaction, the actions of one unit in a system can, intentionally, be oriented to bringing about a change in what the actions of one or more other units would otherwise have been—thus all fitting into the context of Dahl's conception of power. It is convenient to state this in terms of the convention of speaking of the acting unit of reference—individual or collective—as *ego*, and the object on which he attempts to "operate" as *alter*. We may then classify the alternatives open to ego in terms of two dichotomous variables. On the one hand ego may attempt to gain his end from alter either

¹⁵ There is a certain element of generality in physical force as a negative sanction, which gives it a special place in power systems. This will be taken up later in the discussion.

¹⁶ There are complications here deriving from the fact that power is associated with *negative* sanctions and hence that, in the face of severe resistance, their effectiveness is confined to deterrence.

by using some form of control over the situation in which alter is placed, actually or contingently to change it so as to increase the probability of alter acting in the way he wishes, or, alternatively, without attempting to change alter's situation, ego may attempt to change alter's intentions, i.e. he may manipulate symbols which are meaningful to alter in such a way that he tries to make alter "see" that what ego wants is a "good thing" for him (alter) to do.

The second variable then concerns the type of sanctions ego may employ in attempting to guarantee the attainment of his end from alter. The dichotomy here is between positive and negative sanctions. Thus through the situational channel a positive sanction is a change in alter's situation presumptively considered by alter as to his advantage, which is used as a means by ego of having an effect on alter's actions. A negative sanction then is an alteration in alter's situation to the latter's disadvantage. In the case of the intentional channel, the positive sanction is the expression of symbolic "reasons" why compliance with ego's wishes is "a good thing" independently of any further action on ego's part, from alter's point of view, i.e. would be felt by him to be "personally advantageous," whereas the negative sanction is presenting reasons why noncompliance with ego's wishes should be felt by alter to be harmful to interests in which he had a significant personal investment and should therefore be avoided. I should like to call the four types of "strategy" open to ego respectively (1) for the situational channel, positive sanction case, "inducement"; (2) situational channel negative sanction, "coercion"; (3) intentional channel, positive sanction "persuasion," and (4) intentional channel negative sanction "activation of commitments" as shown in the following table:

Sanction type		Channel	
Positive	Intentional	3	1 Situational
	Persuasion		Inducement
Negative	Activation of Commitments	4	2 Coercion

A further complication now needs to be introduced. We think of a sanction as an intentional act on ego's part, expected by him to change his

relation to alter from what it would otherwise have been. As a means of bringing about a change in alter's action, it can operate most obviously where the actual imposition of the sanction is made contingent on a future decision by alter. Thus a process of inducement will operate in two stages, first contingent offer on ego's part that, if alter will "comply" with his wishes, ego will "reward" him by the contingently promised situational change. If then alter in fact does comply, ego will perform the sanctioning act. In the case of coercion the first stage is a contingent threat that, unless alter decides to comply, ego will impose the negative sanction. If, however, alter complies, then nothing further happens, but, if he decides on noncompliance, then ego must carry out his threat, or be in a position of "not meaning it." In the cases of the intentional channel ego's first-stage act is either to predict the occurrence, or to announce his own intention of doing something which affects alter's sentiments or interests. The element of contingency enters in in that ego "argues" to alter, that if this happens, on the one hand alter should be expected to "see" that it would be a good thing for him to do what ego wants—the positive case—or that if he fails to do it it would imply an important "subjective cost" to alter. In the positive case, beyond "pointing out" if alter complies, ego is obligated to deliver the positive attitudinal sanction of approval. In the negative case, the corresponding attitudinal sanction of disapproval is implemented only for noncompliance.

It is hence clear that there is a basic asymmetry between the positive and negative sides of the sanction aspect of the paradigm. This is that, in the cases of inducement and persuasion, alter's compliance obligates ego to "deliver" his promised positive sanction, in the former case the promised advantages, in the latter his approval of alter's "good sense" in recognizing that the decision wished for by ego and accepted as "good" by alter, in fact turns out to be good from alter's point of view. In the negative cases, on the other hand, compliance on alter's part obligates ego, in the situational case, not to carry out his threat, in the intentional case by withholding disapproval to confirm to alter that his compliance did in fact spare him what to him, without ego's intervention, would have been the undesirable subjective consequences of his previous intentions, namely guilt over violations of his commitments.

Finally, alter's freedom of action in his de-

isions of compliance versus noncompliance is also a variable. This range has a lower limit at which the element of contingency disappears. That is, from ego's point of view, he may not say, if you do so and so, I will intervene, either by situational manipulations or by "arguments" in such and such a way, but he may simply perform an overt act and face alter with a *fait accompli*. In the case of inducement a gift which is an object of value and with respect to the acceptance of which alter is given no option is the limiting case. With respect to coercion, compulsion, i.e. simply imposing a disadvantageous alteration on alter's situation and then leaving it to alter to decide whether to "do something about it" is the limiting case.

The asymmetry just referred to appears here as well. As contingent it may be said that the primary meaning of negative sanctions is as means of prevention. If they are effective, no further action is required. The case of compulsion is that in which it is rendered impossible for alter to avoid the undesired action on ego's part. In the case of positive sanctions of course ego, for example in making a gift to alter, cuts himself out from benefiting from alter's performance which is presumptively advantageous to him, in the particular exchange.

Both, however, may be oriented to their effect on alter's action in future sequences of interaction. The object of compulsion may have been "taught a lesson" and hence be less disposed to noncompliance with ego's wishes in the future, as well as prevented from performance of a particular undesired act and the recipient of a gift may feel a "sense of obligation" to reciprocate in some form in the future.

So far this discussion has dealt with sanctioning acts in terms of their "intrinsic" significance both to ego and to alter. An offered inducement may thus be possession of a particular object of utility, a coercive threat, that of a particular feared loss, or other noxious experience. But just as, in the initial phase of a sequence, ego transmits his contingent intentions to alter symbolically through communication, so the sanction involved may also be symbolic, e.g. in place of possession of certain intrinsically valuable goods he may offer a sum of money. What we have called the generalized media of interaction then may be used as types of sanctions which may be analyzed in terms of the above paradigm. The factors of generalization and of legitimation of institutionalization, how-

ever, as discussed above, introduce certain complications which we must now take up with reference to power. There is a sense in which power may be regarded as the generalized medium of coercion in the above terms, but this formula at the very least requires very careful interpretation—indeed it will turn out by itself to be inadequate.

I spoke above of the “grounding” of the value of money in the commodity value of the monetary metal, and suggested that there is a corresponding relation of the “value,” i.e. the effectiveness of power, to the intrinsic effectiveness of physical force as a means of coercion and, in the limiting case, compulsion.¹⁷

In interpreting this formula due account must be taken of the asymmetry just discussed. The special place of gold as a monetary base rests on such properties as its durability, high value in small bulk, etc., and high probability of acceptability in exchange, i.e. as means of inducement, in a very wide variety of conditions which are not dependent on an institutionalized order. Ego’s primary aim in resorting to compulsion or coercion, however, is deterrence of unwanted action on alter’s part.¹⁸ Force, therefore, is in the first instance important as the “ultimate” deterrent. It is the means which, again independent of any institutionalized system of order, can be assumed to be “intrinsically” the most effective in the context of deterrence, when means of effectiveness which *are* dependent on institutionalized order are insecure or fail. Therefore, the unit of an action system which commands control of physical force adequate to cope with any potential counter threats of force is more secure than any other in a Hobbesian state of nature.¹⁹

But just as a monetary system resting entirely on gold as the actual medium of exchange is a very primitive one which simply cannot mediate a complex system of market exchange, so a power system in which the only negative sanction is the threat of force is a very primitive one which cannot function to mediate a complex system of organizational coordination—it is far too “blunt” an instrument. Money cannot be only an intrinsi-

cally valuable entity if it is to serve as a generalized medium of inducement, but it must, as we have said, be institutionalized as a symbol; it must be legitimized, and must inspire “confidence” within the system—and must also within limits be deliberately managed. Similarly power cannot be only an intrinsically effective deterrent; if it is to be the generalized medium of mobilizing resources for effective collective action, and for the fulfillment of commitments made by collectivities to what we have here called their constituents; it too must be both symbolically generalized, and legitimized.

There is a direct connection between the concept of bindingness, as introduced above, and deterrence. To treat a commitment or any other form of expectation as binding is to attribute a special importance to its fulfillment. Where it is not a matter simply of maintenance of an established routine, but of undertaking new actions in changed circumstances, where the commitment is thus to undertake types of action contingent on circumstances as they develop, then the risk to be minimized is that such contingent commitments will not be carried out when the circumstances in question appear. Treating the expectation or obligation as binding is almost the same thing as saying that appropriate steps on the other side must be taken to prevent nonfulfillment, if possible. Willingness to impose negative sanctions is, seen in this light, simply the carrying out of the implications of treating commitments as binding, and the agent invoking them “meaning it” or being prepared to insist.

On the other hand there are areas in interaction systems where there is a range of alternatives, choice among which is optional, in the light of the promised advantageousness, situational or “intentional,” of one as compared to other choices. Positive sanctions as here conceived constitute a contingent increment of relative advantageousness, situational or intentional, of the alternative ego desires alter to choose.

If, in these latter areas, a generalized, symbolic medium, is to operate in place of intrinsic advantages, there must be an element of bindingness in the institutionalization of the medium itself—e.g. the fact that the money of a society is “legal tender” which must be accepted in the settlement of debts which have the status of contractual obligations under the law. In the case of money, I suggest that, for the typical acting unit in a market system, what specific under-

¹⁷ I owe the insight into this parallel to Professor Karl W. Deutsch of Yale University (personal discussion).

¹⁸ “Sadistic” infliction of injury without instrumental significance to ego does not belong in this context.

¹⁹ I have attempted to develop this line of analysis of the significance of force somewhat more fully in “Some Reflections of the Role of Force in Social Relations,” in Harry Eckstein, ed., *The Problem of Internal War* (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1963).

takings he enters into is overwhelmingly optional in the above sense, but whether the money involved in the transactions is or is not "good" is not for him to judge, but his acceptance of it is binding. Essentially the same is true of the contractual obligations, typically linking monetary and intrinsic utilities, which he undertakes.

I would now like to suggest that what is in a certain sense the obverse holds true of power. Its "intrinsic" importance lies in its capacity to ensure that obligations are "really" binding, thus if necessary can be "enforced" by negative sanctions. But for power to function as a generalized medium in a complex system, i.e. to mobilize resources effectively for collective action, it must be "legitimized" which in the present context means that in certain respects compliance, which is the common factor among our media, is not binding, to say nothing of being coerced, but is optional. The range within which there exists a continuous system of interlocking binding obligations is essentially that of the internal relations of an organized collectivity in our sense, and of the contractual obligations undertaken on its behalf at its boundaries.

The points at which the optional factors come to bear are, in the boundary relations of the collectivity, where factors of importance for collective functioning other than binding obligations are exchanged for such binding commitments on the part of the collectivity and *vice versa*, nonbinding outputs of the collectivity for binding commitments to it. These "optional" inputs, I have suggested above, are control of productivity of the economy at one boundary, influence through the relations between leadership and the public demands at the other.²⁰

This is a point at which the dissociation of the concept of polity from exclusive relation to government becomes particularly important. In a sufficiently differentiated society, the boundary-relations of the great majority of its important units of collective organization (including some boundaries of government) are boundaries where the overwhelming majority of decisions of commitment are optional in the above sense, though once made, their fulfillment is binding. This, however, is only possible effectively within the range of a sufficiently stable, institutionalized normative order so that the requisite degrees of

freedom are protected, e.g. in the fields of employment and of the promotion of interest-demands and decisions about political support.

This feature of the boundary relations of a particular political unit holds even for cases of local government, in that decisions of residence, employment, or acquisition of property within a particular jurisdiction involve the optional element, since in all these respects there is a relatively free choice among local jurisdictions, even though, once having chosen, the citizen is, for example, subject to the tax policies applying within it—and of course he cannot escape being subject to any local jurisdiction, but must choose among those available.

In the case of a "national" political organization, however, its territorial boundaries ordinarily coincide with a relative break in the normative order regulating social interaction.²¹ Hence across such boundaries an ambiguity becomes involved in the exercise of power in our sense. On the one hand the invoking of binding obligations operates normally without explicit use of coercion within certain ranges where the two territorial collectivity systems have institutionalized their relations. Thus travelers in friendly foreign countries can ordinarily enjoy personal security and the amenities of the principal public accommodations, exchange of their money at "going" rates, etc. Where, on the other hand, the more general relations between national collectivities are at issue, the power system is especially vulnerable to the kind of insecurity of expectations which tends to be met by the explicit resort to threats of coercive sanctions. Such threats in turn, operating on both sides of a reciprocal relationship, readily enter into a vicious circle of resort to more and more "intrinsically" effective or drastic measures of coercion, at the end of which road lies physical force. In other words, the danger of war is endemic in uninstitutionalized relations between territorially organized collectivities.

There is thus an inherent relation between both the use and the control of force and the territorial basis of organization.²² One central condition of

²⁰ Thus, if control of productivity operates through monetary funds, their possessor cannot "force" e.g. prospective employees to accept employment.

²¹ This, of course, is a relative difference. Some hazards increase the moment one steps outside his own home, police protection may be better in one local community than the next, and crossing a state boundary may mean a considerable difference in legal or actual rights.

²² Cf. my paper "The Principal Structures of Community," *Nomos 2* and *Structure and Process*, *op. cit.*, chapter 8. See also W. L. Hurst, *Law and Social Proc-*

the integration of a power system is that it should be effective within a territorial area, and a crucial condition of this effectiveness in turn is the monopoly of control of paramount force within the area. The critical point then, at which the institutional integration of power systems is most vulnerable to strain, and to degeneration into reciprocating threats of the use of force, is between territorially organized political systems. This, notoriously, is the weakest point in the normative order of human society today, as it has been almost from time immemorial.

In this connection it should be recognized that the possession, the mutual threat, and possible use of force is only in a most proximate sense the principal "cause" of war. The essential point is that the "bottleneck" of mutual regression to more and more primitive means of protecting or advancing collective interests is a "channel" into which all elements of tension between the collective units in question may flow. It is a question of the many levels at which such elements of tension may on the one hand build up, on the other be controlled, not of any simple and unequivocal conception of the "inherent" consequences of the possession and possible uses of organized force.

It should be clear that again there is a direct parallel with the economic case. A functioning market system requires integration of the monetary medium. It cannot be a system of N independent monetary units and agencies controlling them. This is the basis on which the main range of extension of a relatively integrated market system tends to coincide with the "politically organized society," as Roscoe Pound calls it, over a territorial area. International transactions require special provisions not required for domestic.

The basic "management" of the monetary system must then be integrated with the institutionalization of political power. Just as the latter depends on an effective monopoly of institutionally organized force, so monetary stability depends on an effective monopoly of basic reserves protecting the monetary unit and, as we shall see later, on centralization of control over the credit system.

THE HIERARCHICAL ASPECT OF POWER SYSTEMS

A very critical question now arises, which may be stated in terms of a crucial difference between *ess in the United States* (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Law School, 1960).

money and power. Money is a "measure of value," as the classical economists put it, in terms of a continuous linear variable. Objects of utility valued in money are more or less valuable than each other in numerically stable terms. Similarly, as medium of exchange, amounts of money differ in the same single dimension. One acting unit in a society has more money—or assets exchangeable for money—than another, less than, or the same.

Power involves a quite different dimension which may be formulated in terms of the conception that A may have power over B . Of course in competitive bidding the holder of superior financial assets has an advantage in that, as economists say, the "marginal utility of money" is less to him than to his competitor with smaller assets. But his "bid" is no more binding on the potential exchange partner than is that of the less affluent bidder, since in "purchasing power" all dollars are "created free and equal." There may be auxiliary reasons why the purveyor may think it advisable to accept the bid of the more affluent bidder; these, however, are not strictly economic, but concern the interrelations between money and other media, and other bases of status in the system.

The connection between the value of effectiveness—as distinguished from utility—and bindingness, implies a conception in turn of the focusing of responsibility for decisions, and hence of authority for their implementation.²³ This implies a special form of inequality of power which in turn implies a priority system of commitments. The implications of having assumed binding commitments, on the fulfillment of which spokesmen for the collectivity are prepared to insist to the point of imposing serious negative sanctions for noncompliance, are of an order of seriousness such that matching the priority system in the commitments themselves there must be priorities in the matter of which decisions take precedence over others and, back of that, of which decision-making agencies have the right to make decisions at what levels. Throughout this discussion the crucial question concerns bindingness. The reference is to the collectivity, and hence the strategic significance of the various "contributions" on the performance of which the effectiveness of its action

²³ As already noted, in this area, I think the analysis of Chester I. Barnard, in *The Function of the Executive*, *op. cit.*, is so outstandingly clear and cogent that it deserves the status of a classic of political theory in my specific sense. See especially chapter X.

depends. Effectiveness for the collectivity as a whole is dependent on hierarchical ordering of the relative strategic importance of these contributions, and hence of the conditions governing the imposition of binding obligations on the contributors.

Hence the power of A over B is, in its legitimized form, the "right" of A , as a decision-making unit involved in collective process, to make decisions which take precedence over those of B , in the interest of the effectiveness of the collective operation as a whole.

The right to use power, or negative sanctions on a barter basis or even compulsion to assert priority of a decision over others, I shall, following Barnard, call authority. Precedence in this sense can take different forms. The most serious ambiguity here seems to derive from the assumption that authority and its attendant power may be understood as implying opposition to the wishes of "lower-order" echelons which hence includes the prerogative of coercing or compelling compliance. Though this is implicit, it may be that the higher-order authority and power may imply the prerogative is primarily significant as "defining the situation" for the performance of the lower-order echelons. The higher "authority" may then make a decision which defines terms within which other units in the collectivity will be expected to act, and this expectation is treated as binding. Thus a ruling by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may exclude certain tax exemptions which units under his jurisdiction have thought taxpayers could claim. Such a decision need not activate an overt conflict between commissioner and taxpayer, but may rather "channel" the decisions of revenue agents and taxpayers with reference to performance of obligations.

There does not seem to be an essential theoretical difficulty involved in this "ambiguity." We can say that the primary function of superior authority is clearly to define the situation for the lower echelons of the collectivity. The problem of overcoming opposition in the form of dispositions to noncompliance then arises from the incomplete institutionalization of the power of the higher authority holder. Sources of this may well include overstepping of the bounds of his legitimate authority on the part of this agent. The concept of compliance should clearly not be limited to "obedience" by subordinates, but is just as importantly applicable to observance of the normative order

by the high echelons of authority and power. The concept of constitutionalism is the critical one at this level, namely that even the highest authority is bound in the strict sense of the concept bindingness used here, by the terms of the normative order under which he operates, e.g. holds office. Hence binding obligations can clearly be "invoked" by lower-order against higher-order agencies as well as *vice versa*.

This of course implies the relatively firm institutionalization of the normative order itself. Within the framework of a highly differentiated polity it implies, in addition to constitutionalism itself, a procedural system for the granting of high political authority, even in private, to say nothing of public organizations, and a legal framework within which such authority is legitimized. This in turn includes another order of procedural institutions within which the question of the legality of actual uses of power can be tested.

POWER AND AUTHORITY

The institutionalization of the normative order just referred to thus comes to focus in the concept of authority. Authority is essentially the institutional code within which the use of power as medium is organized and legitimized. It stands to power essentially as property, as an institution, does to money. Property is a bundle of rights of possession, including above all that of alienation, but also at various levels of control and use. In a highly differentiated institutional system, property rights are focussed on the valuation of utility, i.e. the economic significance of the objects, e.g. for consumption or as factors of production, and this factor comes to be differentiated from authority. Thus, in European feudalism the "landlord" had both property rights in the land, and political jurisdiction over persons acting on the same land. In modern legal systems these components are differentiated from each other so the landowner is no longer the landlord; this function is taken over mainly by local political authority.

Precisely with greater differentiation the focus of the institution becomes more generalized and, while specific objects of possession of course continue to be highly important, the most important object of property comes to be monetary assets, and specific objects are valued as assets, i.e., in terms of potentials of marketability. Today we can say that rights to money assets, the ways in which these can be legitimately acquired and dis-

posed of, the ways in which the interests of other parties must be protected, have come to constitute the core of the institution of property.²⁴

Authority, then, is the aspect of a status in a system of social organization, namely its collective aspect, by virtue of which the incumbent is put in a position legitimately to make decisions which are binding, not only on himself but on the collectivity as a whole and hence its other member-units, in the sense that so far as their implications impinge on their respective roles and statuses, they are bound to act in accordance with these implications. This includes the right to insist on such action though, because of the general division of labor, the holder of authority very often is not himself in a position to "enforce" his decisions, but must be dependent on specialized agencies for this.

If, then, authority be conceived as the institutional counterpart of power, the main difference lies in the fact that authority is not a circulating medium. Sometimes, speaking loosely, we suggest that someone "gives away his property." He can give away property rights in specific possessions but not the institution of property. Similarly the incumbent of an office can relinquish authority by resigning, but this is very different from abolishing the authority of the office. Property as institution is a code defining rights in objects of possession, in the first instance physical objects, then "symbolic" objects, including cultural objects such as "ideas" so far as they are valuable in monetary terms, and of course including money itself, whoever possesses them. Authority, similarly, is a set of rights in status in a collectivity, precisely in the collectivity as actor, including most especially right to acquire and use power in that status.

The institutional stability, which is essential to the conception of a code, then for property inheres in the institutional structure of the market. At a higher level the institution of property includes rights, not only to use and dispose of particular objects of value, but to participate in the system of market transactions.

²⁴ Two particularly important manifestations of this monetization of property are, first the general legal understanding that executors of estates are not obligated to retain the exact physical inventory intact pending full statement, but may sell various items—their fiduciary obligation is focussed on the money value of the estate. Similarly in the law of contract increasing option has been given to compensate with money damages in lieu of the specific "performance" originally contracted for.

It is then essentially the institutionalized code defining rights of participation in the power system which I should like to think of as authority. It is this conception which gives us the basis for the essential distinction between the internal and the external aspects of power relative to a particular collectivity. The collectivity is, by our conception, the definition of the range within which a system of institutionalized rights to hold and use power can be closed. This is to say, the implications of an authoritative decision made at one point in the system can be made genuinely binding at all the other relevant points through the relevant processes of feed-back.

The hierarchical priority system of authority and power, with which this discussion started can, by this criterion, only be binding within a given particular collectivity system. In this sense then a hierarchy of authority—as distinguished from the sheer differences of power of other coercive capacities—must be internal to a collectively organized system in this sense. This will include authority to bind the collectivity in its relations to its environment, to persons and to other collectivities. But bindingness, legitimized and enforced through the agency of this particular collectivity, cannot be extended beyond its boundaries. If it exists at all it must be by virtue of an institutionalized normative order which transcends the particular collectivity, through contractual arrangements with others, or through other types of mutually binding obligation.

POWER, INFLUENCE, EQUALIZATION, AND SOLIDARITY

It is on this basis that it may be held that at the boundaries of the collectivity the closed system of priorities is breached by "free" exercise, at the constituency or integrative boundary, of influence. Status in the collectivity gives authority to settle the terms on which power will be exchanged with influence over this boundary. The wielder of influence from outside, on the collectivity, is not bound in advance to any particular terms, and it is of the essence of use of power in the "foreign relations" of the collectivity, that authority is a right, within certain limits of discretion, to spend power in exchange for influence. This in turn can, through the offer of accepting leadership responsibility in exchange for political support, replenish the expenditure of power by a corresponding input.

By this reasoning influence should be capable of altering the priority system within the collectivity. This is what I interpret policy decision as a category of the use of power as a medium to be, the process of altering priorities in such a way that the new pattern comes to be binding on the collectivity. Similarly, the franchise must be regarded as the institutionalization of a marginal, interpenetrating status, between the main collectivity and its environment of solidary groupings in the larger system. It is the institutionalization of a marginal authority, the use of which is confined to the function of selection among candidates for leadership responsibility. In the governmental case, this is the inclusion in a common collectivity system of both the operative agencies of government and the "constituencies" on which leadership is dependent, a grant not only in a given instance of power to the latter but a status of authority with respect to the one crucial function of selection of leadership and granting them the authority of office.

In interpreting this discussion it is essential to keep in mind that a society consists, from the present point of view, not in one collectivity, but in a ramified system of collectivities. Because, however, of the basic imperatives of effective collective action already discussed, these must in addition to the pluralistic cross-cutting which goes with functional differentiation, also have the aspect of a "Chinese box" relation. There must be somewhere a paramount focus of collective authority and with it of the control of power—though it is crucial that this need not be the top of the total system of normative control, which may for example be religious. This complex of territoriality and the monopoly of force are central to this, because the closed system of enforceable bindingness can always be breached by the intervention of force.²⁵

The bindingness of normative orders other than those upheld by the paramount territorial collectivity must be defined within limits institutionalized in relation to it. So far as such collectivities are not "agencies" of the state, in this sense, their

²⁵ Since this system is the territorially organized collectivity, the state with its government, these considerations underlie the critical importance of foreign relations in the sense of the relations to other territorially organized, force-controlling collectivities, since, once internal control of force is effectively institutionalized, the danger of this kind of breach comes from the outside in this specific sense of outside. The point is cogently made by Raymond Aron.

spheres of "jurisdiction" must be defined in terms of a normative system, a body of law, which is binding both on government and on the non-governmental collectivity units, though in the "last analysis" it will, within an institutionalized order either have to be enforced by government, or contrariwise, by revolutionary action against government.

Since independent control of serious, socially organized force cannot be given to "private" collectivities, their ultimate negative sanctions tend to be expulsion from membership, though many other types of sanction may be highly important.

Considerations such as these thus do not in any way eliminate or weaken the importance of hierarchical priorities within a collective decision-system itself. The strict "line" structure of such authority is, however, greatly modified by the interpenetration of other systems with the political, notably for our purposes the importance of technical competence. The qualifications of the importance of hierarchy apply in principle at the boundaries of the particular collective system—analytically considered—rather than internally to it. These I would interpret as defining the limits of authority. There are two main contexts in which norms of equality may be expected to modify the concrete expectations of hierarchical decision-systems, namely on the one hand, the context of influence over the right to assume power, or decision-making authority and, on the other hand, the context of access to opportunity for status as a contributing unit in the specific political system in question.

It is essential here to recall that I have treated power as a circulating medium, moving back and forth over the boundaries of the polity. The "real" outputs of the political process, and the factors in its effectiveness—in the sense corresponding to the real outputs and factors of economic production—are not in my sense "forms" of power but, in the most important cases, of financial control of economic resources, and of influence, in the meaning of the category of influence, defined as a generalized mechanism of persuasion. These are very essential elements in the total political process, but it is just as important to distinguish them from power as it is to distinguish financially valuable outputs and factors of production from money itself. They may, in certain circumstances, be exchangeable for power, but this is a very different thing from being forms of power.

The circulation of power between polity and integrative system I conceive to consist in binding policy decisions on the one hand, which is a primary factor in the integrative process, and political support on the other, which is a primary output of the integrative process. Support is exchanged, by a "public" or constituency, for the assumption of leadership responsibility, through the process of persuading those in a position to give binding support that it is advisable to do so in the particular instance—through the use of influence or some less generalized means of persuasion. In the other political "market" *vis-à-vis* the integrative system, policy decisions are given in response to interest-demands in the sense of the above discussion. This is to say that interest groups, which, it is most important to note as a concept says nothing about the moral quality of the particular interest, attempt to persuade those who hold authority in the relevant collectivity, i.e. are in a position to make binding decisions, that they should indeed commit the collectivity to the policies the influence-wielders want. In our terms this is to persuade the decision makers to use and hence "spend" some of their power for the purpose in hand. The spending of power is to be thought of, just as the spending of money, as essentially consisting in the sacrifice of alternative decisions which are precluded by the commitments undertaken under a policy. A member of the collectivity we conceive as noted to have authority to "spend" power through making binding decisions through which those outside acquire claims against the collectivity. Its authority, however, is inalienable; it can only be exercised, not "spent."

It has been suggested that policies must be hierarchically ordered in a priority system and that the power to decide among policies must have a corresponding hierarchical ordering since such decisions bind the collectivity and its constituent units. The imperative of hierarchy does not, however, apply to the other "market" of the power system in this direction, that involving the relations between leadership and political support. Here on the contrary it is a critically important fact that in the largest-scale and most highly differentiated systems, namely the leadership systems of the most "advanced" national societies, the power element has been systematically equalized through the device of the franchise, so that the universal adult franchise has been evolved in all

the Western democracies.²⁶ Equality of the franchise which, since the consequences of its exercise are very strictly binding,²⁷ I classify as in fact a form of power, has been part of a larger complex of its institutionalization, which includes in addition the principle of universality—its extension to all responsible adult citizens in good standing and the secrecy of the ballot, which serves to differentiate this context of political action from other contexts of involvement, and protect it against pressures, not only from hierarchical superiors but, as Rokkan points out, from status-peers as well.

Of course the same basic principle of one member, one vote, is institutionalized in a vast number of voluntary associations, including many which are subassociations of wider collectivities, such as faculties in a university, or boards and committees. Thus the difference between a chairman or presiding officer, and an executive head is clearly marked with respect to formal authority, whatever it may be with respect to influence, by the principle that a chairman, like any other member, has only one vote. Many collectivities are in this sense "truncated" associations, e.g. in cases where fiduciary boards are self-recruiting. Nevertheless the importance of this principle of equality of power through the franchise is so great empirically that the question of how it is grounded in the structure of social systems is a crucial one.

It derives, I think, from what I should call the universalistic component in patterns of normative order. It is the value-principle that discriminations among units of a system, must be grounded in intrinsically valued differences among them, which are, for both persons and collectivities, capacities to contribute to valued societal processes. Differences of power in decision-making which mobilizes commitments, both outward in relation to the environment of the collectivity and internally, to the assignment of tasks to its members, are ideally grounded in the intrinsic conditions of effectiveness. Similarly, differences on the basis of technical competence to fulfill essential roles are grounded in the strategic conditions of effective contribution.

These considerations do not, however, apply to the functions of the choice of leadership, where

²⁶ See, on this process, Stein Rokkan, "Mass Suffrage, Secret Voting, and Political Participation," *European Journal of Sociology* 2 (1961): 132-152.

²⁷ I.e., the aggregate of votes, evaluated by the electoral rules, determines the incumbency of office.

this choice has been freed from ascriptive bases of right, e.g. through kinship status or some imputed "charismatic" superiority as in such a case as "white supremacy." There is a persistent pressure of the sufficiently highly valued functions or outcomes, and under this pressure there seems to have been a continual, though uneven, process of erosion of discriminations in this critical field of the distribution of power.

It may be suggested that the principle of universalistic normative organization which is immediately superordinate to that of political democracy in the sense of the universal equal franchise, is the principle of equality before the law; in the case of the American Constitution, the principle of equal protection of the laws. I have emphasized that a constitutional framework is essential to advanced collective organization, given of course levels of scale and complexity which preclude purely "informal" and traditional normative regulation. The principle in effect puts the burden of proof on the side of imposing discriminations, either in access to rights or in imposition of obligations, on the side that such discriminations are to be justified only by differences in sufficiently highly valued exigencies of operation of the system.

The principle of equality both at the level of application of the law and of the political franchise, is clearly related to a conception of the status of membership. Not all living adults have equal right to influence the affairs of all collectivities everywhere in the world, nor does an American have equal rights with a citizen of a quite different society within its territory. Membership is in fact the application to the individual unit of the concept of boundary of a social system which has the property of solidarity, in Durkheim's sense. The equal franchise is a prerogative of members, and of course the criteria of membership can be very differently institutionalized under different circumstances.

There is an important sense in which the double interchange system under consideration here, which I have called the "support" system linking the polity with the integrative aspect of the society, is precisely the system in which power is most directly controlled, both in relation to more particularized interest-elements which seek relatively particularized policies—which of course includes wanting to prevent certain potential actions—and in relation to the more general "tone" given to the directionality of collective action by the

character of the leadership elements which assume responsibility and which, in exchange, are invested, in the type case by the electoral process, with authority to carry out their responsibilities. One central feature of this control is coming to terms with the hierarchical elements inherent in power systems in the aspects just discussed. Certain value systems may of course reinforce hierarchy, but it would be my view that a universalistically oriented value system inherently tends to counteract the spread of hierarchical patterns with respect to power beyond the range felt to be functionally necessary for effectiveness.²⁸

There is, however, a crucial link between the equality of the franchise and the hierarchical structure of authority within collectivities, namely the all-or-none character of the electoral process. Every voter has an equal vote in electing to an office, but in most cases only one candidate is in fact elected—the authority of office is not divided among candidates in proportion to the numbers of votes they received, but is concentrated in the successful candidate, even though the margin be very narrow, as in the U. S. presidential election of 1960. There are, of course, considerable possible variations in electoral rules, but this basic principle is as central as is that of the equality of the franchise. This principle seems to be the obverse of the hierarchy of authority.

The hierarchical character of power systems has above been sharply contrasted with the linear quantitative character of wealth and monetary assets. This has in turn been related to the fundamental difference between the exigencies of effectiveness in collective action, and the exigencies of utility in providing for the requirements of satisfying the "wants" of units. In order to place the foregoing discussion of the relations between power and influence in a comparable theoretical context, it is necessary to formulate the value-standard which is paramount in regulating the integrative function which corresponds to utility

²⁸ Of course where conditions are sufficiently simple, or where there is sufficient anxiety about the hierarchical implications of power, the egalitarian element may penetrate far into the political decision-making system itself, with, e.g. insistence that policy-decisions, both external and internal in reference, be made by majority vote of all members, or even under a unanimity rule. The respects in which such a system—which of course realistically often involves a sharply hierarchical stratification of influence—is incompatible with effectiveness in many spheres, can be said to be relatively clear, especially for *large* collectivities.

and effectiveness in the economic and political functions respectively.

This is, with little doubt, the famous concept of solidarity as formulated by Durkheim.²⁹ The two essential points of reference for present purposes concern the two main aspects of membership, as outlined above, the first of which concerns claims on executive authority for policy decisions which integrate the total collective interest on the one hand, the "partial" interest of a subgroup on the other. The second concerns integration of rights to a "voice" in collective affairs with the exigencies of effective leadership and the corresponding responsibility.

The principle is the "grounding" of a collective system in a consensus in the sense of the above discussion, namely an "acceptance" on the part of its members of their belonging together, in the sense of sharing, over a certain range, common interests, interests which are defined both by type, and by considerations of time. Time becomes relevant because of the uncertainty factor in all human action, and hence the fact that neither benefits nor burdens can be precisely predicted and planned for in advance; hence an effective collectivity must be prepared to absorb unexpected burdens, and to balance this, to carry out some sort of just distribution of benefits which are unexpected and/or are not attributable to the earned agency of any particular subunit.

Solidarity may then be thought of as the implementation of common values by definition of the requisite collective systems in which they are to be actualized. Collective action as such we have defined as political function. The famous problem of order, however, cannot be solved without a common normative system. Solidarity is the principle by virtue of which the commitment to norms, which is "based" in turn on values, is articulated with the formation of collectivities which are capable of effective collective action. Whereas, in the economic direction, the "problem" of effective action is coping with the scarcity of available resources, including trying to facilitate their mobility, in the integrative direction it is orderly solution of competing claims, on the one hand to receive benefits—or minimize

losses—deriving from memberships, on the other to influence the processes by which collective action operates. This clearly involves some institutionalization of the subordination of unit-interest to the collective in cases where the two are in conflict, actual or potential, and hence the justification of unit interests as compatible with the more extensive collective interest. A social system then possesses solidarity in proportion as its members are committed to common interests through which discrete unit interests can be integrated and the justification of conflict resolution and subordination can be defined and implemented. It defines, not the modes of implementation of these common interests through effective agency, but the standards by which such agency should be guided and the rights of various constituent elements to have a voice in the interpretation of these standards.

POWER AND EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY

We may now turn to the second major boundary of the polity, at which another order of modifications of the internal hierarchy of authority comes to focus. This is the boundary *vis-à-vis* the economy where the "political" interest is to secure control of productivity and services, and the economic interest lies in the collective control of fluid resources and in what we may call opportunity for effectiveness. I shall not attempt here to discuss the whole interchange complex, but will confine myself to the crucial problem of the way that here also the hierarchical structure of power can, under certain conditions, be modified in an egalitarian direction.

Productivity of the economy is in principle allocable among collective (in our sense political) claimants to its control as facilities, in linear quantitative terms. This linear quantification is achieved through the medium of money, either allocation of funds with liberty to expend them at will, or at least monetary evaluation of more specific facilities.

In a sufficiently developed system, services must be evaluated in monetary terms also, both from the point of view of rational budgeting and of the monetary cost of their employment. In terms of their utilization, however, services are "packages" of performance-capacity, which are qualitatively distinct and of unequal value as contributions to collective effectiveness. Their evaluation as facilities must hence involve an estimate of strategic significance which matches the general priority

²⁹ It is the central concept of *The Division of Labor in Society*. For my own relatively recent understanding of its significance, see "Durkheim's Contribution to the Theory of Integration of Social Systems," in Kurt Wolff, Ed., *Emile Durkheim, 1858-1917* (Ohio, Ohio State University Press, 1960), pp. 118-153.

scale which has been established to regulate the internal functioning of the collectivity.

Services, however, constitute a resource to be acquired from outside the collectivity, as Weber puts it through a "formally free" contract of employment. The contracts thus made are binding on both sides, by virtue of a normative system transcending the particular collectivity, though the obligation must articulate with the internal normative order including its hierarchical aspect. But the purveyors of service are not, in advance, bound by this internal priority system and hence an exchange, which is here interpreted to operate in the first instance as between strategic significance expressed as power-potential, and the monetary value of the service, must be arrived at.

Quite clearly, when the purveyor of service has once entered into such a contract, he is bound by the aspect of its terms which articulates the service into this internal system, including the level of authority he exercises and its implications for his power position in the collectivity. If the collectivity is making in any sense a rational arrangement, this must be tailored to an estimate of the level of the value of his strategic contribution, hence his performance-capacity.

Since, however, the boundary interchange is not integral to the internal system of bindingness, the hierarchical imperatives do not apply to the opportunity aspect of this interchange on the extra-political side. This is to say that the same order of pressures of a higher-order universalistic normative system can operate here that we suggested operated to bring about equality in the franchise. Again the principle is that no particularistic discriminations are to be legitimized which are not grounded in essential functional exigencies of the system of reference.

In the case of the franchise there seems to be no inherent stopping place short of complete equality, qualified only by the minimum consideration of competence attached to fully responsible membership—excluding only minors, "defectives," through retardation and mental illness, and those morally disqualified through crime. In the service case, on the other hand, given commitments to optimum performance which in the present context can be taken for granted, the limit to the equating of universalism and equality lies in the concept of competence. Hence the principle arrived at is the famous one of equality of opportunity, by which there is equalization of access to opportunity for contribution, but selection on criteria of differ-

ential competence, both quantitative and qualitative.

Whereas the equalization of the franchise is a control on differential power "from above" in the hierarchy of control and operates mainly through the selection of leadership, equality of opportunity is (in the corresponding sense) a control from below, and operates to check particularistic tendencies which would tend to exclude sources of service which are qualified by competence to contribute, and/or to check tendencies to retain services which are inferior to those available in competition with them.

It is the combination of these two foci of universalization, the equalitarianism of upper rights to control through the franchise, and of rights to participate through service on the basis of competence, which account for the extent to which the "cumulative advantage,"³⁰ which might seem to be inherent in the hierarchical internal structure of power systems, often in fact fails either to materialize at all, or to be as strong as expected.

Long and complex as it is, the above discussion may be summed up as an attempted solution of the second of the three main problems with which this paper began, namely that of the relation between the coercive and the consensual aspects of the phenomenon of power. The answer is first premised on the conception of power as a specific but generalized medium of the functioning of social relationships in complex, differentiated systems of social interaction.

Power is secondly specifically associated with the bindingness of obligations to performance within a range of circumstances which may arise in a varying and changing situation. The obligations concerned are hence in some important degree generalized so that particularities under them are contingent on circumstances. The bindingness of obligations implies that they stand on a level of seriousness such that the invoking agent, ego, may be put in the position of asserting that, since he "means it" that alter must comply, he is prepared to insist on compliance. Partly then as a symbolic expression of this seriousness of "meaning it" and partly as an instrument of deterrence of noncompliance,³¹ this insistence is

³⁰ Cf. C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1956) and my commentary in *Structure and Process in Modern Societies*, *op. cit.*, chapter 6.

³¹ Cf. Durkheim's famous essay, "Deux lois de l'évolution pénale," *L'Année Sociologique* 4(1899-1900): 65-95.

associated with command of negative situational sanctions the application of which is frequently contingent on noncompliance, and in certain cases deterrence is achieved by compulsion. We would not speak of power where situational negative sanctions or compulsion are in no circumstances attached to noncompliance in cases where a legitimate agent insists on compliance.

Thirdly, however, power is here conceived as a generalized medium of mobilizing commitments or obligation for effective collective action. As such it ordinarily does not itself possess intrinsic effectiveness, but symbolizes effectiveness and hence the bindingness of the relevant obligations to contribute to it. The operative validity of the meaningfulness of the symbolization is not a function of any one single variable but, we argue, of two primary ones. One of these is the willingness to insist upon compliance, or at least to deter noncompliance, a line of reasoning which leads to the understanding of willingness to resort to negative sanctions, the nature of which will vary, as a function of the seriousness of the question, on the dimension of their progressively more drastic nature, in the last analysis force.

The other variable concerns the collective reference and hence the justification³² of invoking the obligations in question in the situation. This aspect concerns the dependence of power on the institutionalization of authority and hence the rights of collective agents to mobilize performances and define them as binding obligations. This justification inherently rests on some sort of consensus among the members of the collectivity of reference, if not more broadly, with respect to a system of norms under which authority and power are legitimized on a basis wider than this particular collectivity by the values of the system. More specifically, authority is the institutionalized code within which the "language of power" is meaningful and, therefore, its use will be accepted in the requisite community, which is in the first instance the community of collective organization in our sense.

Seen in this light the threat of coercive measures, or of compulsion, without legitimation or justification, should not properly be called the use of power at all, but is the limiting case where power, losing its symbolic character, merges into an intrinsic instrumentality of securing compli-

³² Cf. my paper "On The Concept of Influence," *op. cit.*, for a discussion of the concept of justification and its distinction from legitimation.

ance with wishes, rather than obligations. The monetary parallel is the use of a monetary metal as an instrument of barter where as a commodity it ceases to be an institutionalized medium of exchange at all.

In the history of thought there has been a very close connection between emphasis on the coercive element in power systems and on the hierarchical aspect of the structure of systems of authority and power. The above discussion has, I hope, helped to dissociate them by showing that this hierarchical aspect, important as it is, is only part of the structure of power systems. The view advanced is that it is an inherent aspect of the internal structure of collectivities. No collectivity, even the nation, however, stands alone as a total society since it is integrated with norms and values; subcollectivities can even less be claimed to be societies. The collectivity aspect of total social structure may in a particular case be dominant over others, but always in principle it impinges on at least two sorts of boundary-problems, namely that involved in its "support" system and that involved in the mobilization of services as sources of contribution to its functioning.

In both these cases, we have argued, quite different principles are operative from that of the hierarchy of authority, namely the equality of franchise on the one hand, equality of opportunity on the other. In both cases I envisage an interchange of power, though not of authority, over the boundary of the polity, and in neither case can the principle governing the allocation of power through this interchange be considered to be hierarchical in the line authority sense. The empirical problems here are, as elsewhere, formidable, but I definitely argue that it is illegitimate to hold that, from serious consideration of the role of power as a generalized medium, it can be inferred that there is a general trend to hierarchization in the total empirical social systems involved.³³

THE ZERO-SUM PROBLEM

We are now in a position to take up the last of the three main problems with which the discussion started, namely whether power is a zero-sum phenomenon in the sense that, in a system, a gain in

³³ Failure to see this seems to me to be a major source of the utopian strain in Marxist theory, expressed above all by the expectation of the "withering away of the state." There is perhaps a parallel to the confusion connected for many centuries with the Aristotelian doctrine of the "sterility" of money.

power by a unit *A* is in the nature of the case the cause of a corresponding loss of power by other units, *B*, *C*, *D*. . . . The parallel with money on which we have been insisting throughout should give us clues to the answer, which clearly is, under certain circumstances yes, but by no means under all circumstances.

In the monetary case it is obvious that in budgeting the use of a fixed income, allocation to one use must be at the expense of alternative uses. The question is whether parallel limitations apply to an economy conceived as a total system. For long this seemed to many economists to be the case; this was the main burden of the old "quantity theory of money." The most obvious political parallel is that of the hierarchy of authority within a particular collectivity. It would seem to be obvious that, if *A*, who has occupied a position of substantial power, is demoted, and *B* takes his place, *A* loses power and *B* gains it, the total in the system remaining the same. Many political theorists like Lasswell and C. Wright Mills, generalized this to political systems as a whole.³⁴

The most important and obvious point at which the zero-sum doctrine breaks down for money is that of credit-creation through commercial banking. This case is so important as a model that a brief discussion here is in order. Depositors, that is, entrust their money funds to a bank, not only for safe keeping, but as available to the bank for lending. In so doing, however, they do not relinquish any property rights in these funds. The funds are repayable by the bank in full on demand, the only normal restrictions being with respect to banking hours. The bank, however, uses part of the balances on deposit with it to make loans at interest, pursuant to which it not only makes the money available to the borrower, but in most cases assumes binding obligations not to demand repayment except on agreed terms, which in general leave the borrower undisturbed control for a stipulated period—or obligates him to specified installments of amortization. In other words, the same dollars come to do "double duty," to be treated as possessions by the depositors, who retain their property rights, and also by the banker who preempts the rights to loan them, as if they were "his." In any case there is a corresponding net addition to the circulating medium, measured

by the quantity of new bank deposits created by the loans outstanding.³⁵

Perhaps the best way to describe what happens is to say that there has occurred a differentiation in the functions of money and hence there are two ways of using it in the place of one. The ordinary deposit is a reserve for meeting current expenses, whether "private" or "business," which is mainly important with respect to the time element of the degrees of freedom mentioned above. From the point of view of the depositor the bank is a convenience, giving him safekeeping, the privilege of writing checks rather than using cash, etc., at a cost which is low because the bank earns interest through its loaning operations. From the point of view of the borrower, on the other hand, the bank is a source of otherwise unavailable funds, ideally in the economist's sense, for investment, for financing operations promising future increments of economic productivity, which would not otherwise have been feasible.

The possibility of this "miracle of loaves and fishes" of course rests on an empirical uniformity, namely that depositors do in fact, under normal circumstances, keep sufficient balances on hand—though they are not required to—so that it is safe for the bank to have substantial amounts out on loan at any given time. Underlying this basic uniformity is the fact that an individual bank will ordinarily also have access to "reserves," e.g. assets which, though earning interest, are sufficiently liquid to be realized on short notice, and in the last analysis such resources as those of a federal reserve system. The individual bank, and with it its depositors, is thus ordinarily relatively secure.

We all know, however, that this is true only so long as the system operates smoothly. A particular bank can meet unusual demands for withdrawal of deposits, but if this unusual demand spreads to a whole banking system, the result may be a crisis, which only collective action can solve. Quite clearly the expectation that all depositors should be paid, all at once, in "real" money, e.g. even "cash" to say nothing of monetary metal, cannot be fulfilled. Any monetary system in which bank credit plays an important part is in the nature of the case normally "insolvent" by that standard.

³⁴ H. D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950) and Mills, *The Power Elite*, *op. cit.*

³⁵ Whether this be interpreted as net addition to the medium or as increase in the velocity of circulation of the "slow" deposit funds, is indifferent, because its economic effects are the same.

Back of these considerations, it may be said, lies an important relation between bindingness and "confidence" which is in certain respects parallel to that between coercion and consensus in relation to power, indeed one which, through the element of bindingness, involves a direct articulation between money and power. How is this parallel to be defined and how does the articulation operate?

First the banking operation depends on mutual confidence or trust in that depositors entrust their funds to the bank, knowing, if they stop to think about it, that the bank will have a volume of loans outstanding which makes it impossible to repay all deposits at once. It is well known with what hesitation, historically, many classes have been brought to trust banks at all in this simple sense—the classical case of the French peasant's insistence on putting his savings in cash under the mattress is sufficient illustration. The other side of the coin, however, is the bank's trust that its depositors will not panic to the point of in fact demanding the complete fulfillment of their legal rights.

The banker here assumes binding obligations in two directions, the honoring of both of which depends on this trust. On the one hand he has loaned money on contract which he cannot recover on demand, on the other he is legally bound to repay deposits on demand. But by making loans on binding contractual terms he is enabled to create money, which is purchasing power in the literal sense that, as noted above, the status of the monetary unit is politically guaranteed—e.g. through its position as "legal tender"—and hence the newly created dollars are "as good as" any other dollars. Hence I suggest that what makes them good in this sense is the input of power in the form of the bindingness of the contractual obligation assumed by the banker—I should classify this as opportunity for effectiveness. The bank, as collectivity, thus enjoys a "power position" by virtue of which it can give its borrowers effective control of certain types of opportunity.

It is, however, critically important that in general this grant of power is not unconditional. First it is power in its form of direct convertibility with money, and second, within that framework, the condition is that, per unit of time, there should be a surplus of money generated, the borrower can and must return more money than he received, the difference being "interest." Money, however, is a measure of productivity, and hence we may say that increasing the quantity of money

in circulation is economically "functional" only if it leads after a sequence of operations over a period of time to a corresponding increase in productivity—if it does not the consequence is inflationary. The process is known as investment, and the standard of a good investment is the expected increment of productivity which, measured in money terms, is profitability. The organizational question of allocation of responsibility for decisions and payments should of course not be too directly identified with the present level of analytical argument.

It may help round out this picture if the concept of investment is related to that of "circular flow" in Schumpeter's sense.³⁶ The conception is that the routine functioning of economic processes is organized about the relation between producing and consuming units, we may say firms and households. So long as a series of parametric constants such as the state of demand and the coefficients of cost of production hold, this is a process in equilibrium through which money mediates the requisite decisions oriented to fixed reference points. This is precisely the case to which the zero-sum concept applies. On the one hand a fixed quantity and "velocity of circulation" of the monetary medium is an essential condition of the stability of this equilibrium, whereas on the other hand, there is no place for banking operations which, through credit expansion, would change the parametric conditions.

These decisions are governed by the standard of solvency, in the sense that both producing and consuming units are normally expected to recoup their monetary expenditures, on the one hand for factors of production, on the other for consumers' goods, from monetary proceeds, on the producing side, sale of output, on the consuming, sale of factors of production, notably labor. Solvency then is a balance between monetary cost and receipts. Investment is also governed by the standard of solvency, but over a longer time period, long enough to carry out the operations necessary to bring about an increase of productivity matching the monetary obligations assumed.

There is here a crucial relation between the time-extension of the investment process and use of power to make loan contracts binding. Only if the extension of control of resources through loans creates obligations can the recipients of the

³⁶ Joseph Schumpeter, *The Theory of Economic Development* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1955), translated by Redvers Opie.

loans in turn assume further obligations and expect others to assume them.

The essential principle here is that, in the sense of the hierarchy of control, a higher-order medium is used as a source of leverage to break into the "circle" of the Schumpeterian flow, giving the recipients of this power effective control of a share of fluid resources in order to divert them from the established routine channels to new uses. It is difficult to see how this could work systematically if the element of bindingness were absent either from loan contracts or from the acceptance-status of the monetary medium.

One further element of the monetary complex needs to be mentioned here. In the case of investment there is the element of time, and hence the uncertainty that projected operations aiming at increase in productivity will in fact produce either this increase or financial proceeds sufficient to repay loans plus interest in accordance with contract. In the case of the particular borrower-lender relationship this can be handled on an individual contract-solvency basis with a legally determined basis of sharing profits and/or losses. For the system, however, it creates the possibility of inflation, namely that the net effect of credit-extension may not be increase in productivity but decline in the value of the monetary unit. Furthermore, once a system involves an important component of credit, the opposite disturbance, namely deflation with a rearrangement of the meaning of the whole network of financial and credit expectations and relationships, is also a possibility. This suggests that there is, in a ramified credit economy, a set of mechanisms which, independently of particular circular flow, and credit-extension and repayment transactions regulates the total volume of credit, rates of interest, and price-level relations in the economy.

ZERO-SUM: THE CASE OF POWER

Let us now attempt to work out the parallel, and articulating, analysis for power systems. There is, I suggest, a circular flow operating between polity and economy in the interchange between factors in political effectiveness—in this case a share of control of the productivity of the economy—and an output to the economy in the form of the kind of control of resources which a there are various other forms. This circular flow loan for investment provides—though of course is controlled by the medium of power in the sense that the input of binding obligations, in particular

through commitment to perform services, broadly balances the output of offer of opportunity for effective performance.

The suggestion is that it is a condition of the stability of this circulation system that the inputs and outputs of power on each side should balance. This is another way of saying that it is ideally formulated as a zero-sum system, so far as power is concerned, though because it includes the investment process, the same is not true for the involvement of monetary funds in the interchanges. The political circular flow system then is conceived as the locus of the "routine" mobilization of performance expectations either through invoking obligations under old contractual—and in some cases, e.g. citizenship, ascriptive—relations, or through a stable rate of assumption of new contractual obligations, which is balanced by the liquidation, typically through fulfillment, of old ones. The balance applies to the system, of course, not to particular units.

Corresponding to utility as the value-pattern governing economic function I have put forward effectiveness as that governing political function. If it is important to distinguish utility, as the category of value to which increments are made by the combinatorial process of economic production, from solvency as the standard of satisfactory performance in handling money as the medium of economic process, then we need to distinguish effectiveness as the political value category, from a corresponding standard for the satisfactory handling of power. The best available term for this standard seems to be the success of collective goal-attainment. Where the polity is sufficiently differentiated so that power has become genuinely generalized medium we can say that collective units are expected to be successful in the sense that the binding obligations they undertake in order to maintain and create opportunities for effectiveness, is balanced by the input of equally binding commitments to perform service, either within the collectivity in some status of employment, or for the collectivity on a contractual basis.

The unit of productive decision-making, however, is, in a sense corresponding to that applying to the household for the economic case, also expected to be successful in the sense that its expenditure of power through not only the output of services but their commitment to utilization by particular collectivities, is balanced by an input of opportunity which is dependent on collective organization, that is a unit in a position to under-

take to provide opportunities which are binding on the unit.

In the light of this discussion it becomes clear that the business firm is in its aspect as collectivity in our technical sense, the case where the two standards of success and solvency coincide. The firm uses its power income primarily to maintain or increase its productivity and, as a measure of this, its money income. A surplus of power will therefore in general be exchanged for enhancement of its control of economic productivity. For a collectivity specialized in political function the primary criterion of success would be given in its power position, relative that is to other collectivities. Here there is the special problem of the meaning of the term power position. I interpret it here as relative to other collectivities in a competitive system, not as a position in an internal hierarchy of power. This distinction is of course particularly important for a pluralistic power system where government is a functionally specialized subsystem of the collectivity structure, not an approximation to the totality of that structure.³⁷ In somewhat corresponding fashion a collectivity specialized in integrative function would measure its success in terms of its "level of influence"—for example, as a political interest-group in the usual sense, its capacity to influence public policy decisions. A consequence of this reasoning is that such an influence group would be disposed to "give away" power, in the sense of trading it for an increment of influence. This could take the form of assuring political support, without barterlike conditions, to leadership elements which seemed to be likely to be able to exercise the kind of influence in question.

Is there then a political equivalent of the banking phenomenon, a way in which the circular flow of power comes to be broken through so as to bring about net additions to the amount of power in the system? The trend of the analytical argument indicates that there must be, and that its focus lies in the support system, that is the area of interchange between power and influence, between polity and integrative system.

First I suggest that, particularly conspicuous in the case of democratic electoral systems, political support should be conceived as a generalized grant of power which, if it leads to electoral success, puts elected leadership in a position analo-

³⁷ If very carefully interpreted, perhaps the old term "sovereignty" could be used to designate this standard somewhat more definitely than success.

gous to that of the banker. The "deposits" of power made by constituents are revocable, if not at will, at the next election—a condition analogous to regularity of banking hours. In some cases election is tied to barterlike conditions of expectation of carrying out certain specific measures favored by the strategically crucial voters and only these. But particularly in a system which is pluralistic not only with reference to the composition of political support, but also to issues, such a leadership element acquires freedom to make certain types of binding decision, binding in the nature of the case on elements of the collectivity other than those whose "interest" is directly served. This freedom may be conceived to be confined to the circular flow level, which would be to say that the input of power through the channel of political support should be exactly balanced by the output through policy decisions, to interest groups which have specifically demanded these decisions.

There is, however, another component of the freedom of elected leadership which is crucial here. This is the freedom to use influence—for example through the "prestige" of office as distinguished from its specified powers—to embark on new ventures in the "equation" of power and influence. This is to use influence to create additions to the total supply of power. How can this be conceived to work?

One important point is that the relation between the media involved with respect to positive and negative sanctions is the obverse of the case of creating money through banking. There it was the use of power embodied in the binding character of loan contracts which "made the difference." Here it is the optional capacity to exert influence through persuasion. This process seems to operate through the function of leadership which, by way of the involvements it possesses with various aspects of the constituency structure of the collectivity, generates and structures new "demands" in the specific sense of demands for policy decision.

Such demands then may be conceived, in the case of the deciders, to justify an increased output of power. This in turn is made possible by the generality of the mandate of political support, the fact that it is not given on a barter basis in exchange for specific policy decisions, but once the "equation" of power and influence has been established through election, it is a mandate to do, within constitutional limits, what seems best, in

the governmental case "in the public interest." Collective leadership may then be conceived as the bankers or "brokers" who can mobilize the binding commitments of their constituents in such a way that the totality of commitments made by the collectivity as a whole can be enhanced. This enhancement must, however, be justified through the mobilization of influence; it must, that is, both be felt to be in accordance with valid norms and apply to situations which "call for" handling at the level of binding collective commitments.

The critical problem of justification is, in one direction, that of consensus, of its bearing on the value-principle of solidarity as we have outlined this above. The standard therefore which corresponds to the value principle of solidarity is consensus in the sense in which that concept has been used above.

The problem then is that of a basis for breaking through the circular stability of a zero-sum power system. The crucial point is that this can only happen if the collectivity and its members are ready to assume new binding obligations over and above those previously in force. The crucial need is to justify this extension and to transform the "sentiment" that something ought to be done into a commitment to implement the sentiment by positive action, including coercive sanctions if necessary. The crucial agency of this process seems to be leadership, precisely conceived as possessing a component analytically independent of the routine power position of office, which defines the leader as the mobilizer of justifications for policies which would not be undertaken under the circular flow assumptions.

It may be suggested that the parallel to credit creation holds with respect to time-extension as well as in other respects. The increments of effectiveness which are necessary to implement new binding policies which constitute an addition to the total burden on the collectivity cannot simply be willed into being; they require organizational changes through recombinations of the factors of effectiveness, development of new agencies, procurement of personnel, new norms, and even changes in bases of legitimation. Hence leadership cannot justifiably be held responsible for effective implementation immediately, and conversely, the sources of political support must be willing to trust their leadership in the sense of not demanding immediate—by the time of the next election—"pay-off" of the power-value of their

votes in their decisions dictated by their own interests.³⁸

It is perhaps legitimate to call the responsibility assumed in this connection specifically leadership responsibility and distinguish it in these terms from administrative responsibility which focuses on the routine functions. In any case I should like to conceive this process of power-enhancement as strictly parallel to economic investment, in the further sense that the pay-off should be an increment to the level of collective success in the sense outlined above, i.e. enhanced effectiveness of collective action in valued areas which could not have been expected without risk-taking on the part of leadership in a sense parallel to entrepreneurial investment.

The operation of both governmental and non-governmental collectivities is full of illustrations of the kind of phenomenon I have in mind, though because this type of formal analysis is somewhat unfamiliar, it is difficult to pin them down exactly. It has, for example, often been pointed out that the relation of executive responsibility to constituency-interests is very different in domestic and in foreign affairs. I suggest that the element of "political banking" in the field of foreign affairs is particularly large and that the sanction of approval of policy decisions, where it occurs, cannot infallibly be translated into votes, certainly not in the short run. Similar considerations are very frequently involved in what may be called "developmental" ventures, which cannot be expected to be "backed" by currently well-structured interests in the same sense as maintenance of current functions. The case of support of research and training is a good one since the "community of scholars" is not a very strong "pressure group" in the sense of capacity directly to influence large blocks of votes.

It would follow from these considerations that there is, in developed polities, a relatively "free-

³⁸ Perhaps this is an unusually clear case of the relativity of the formal legal sense of the bindingness of commitments. Thus the populist component in democratic government often ties both executive and legislative branches rather rigidly in what they can formally promise. However, there are many *de facto* obligations assumed by Government which are very nearly binding. Thus legally Congress could withdraw the totality of funds recently granted to universities for the support of scientific research and training, the formal appropriations being made year by year. Universities, however, plan very much in the expectation of maintenance of these funds and this maintenance is certainly something like a *de facto* obligation of Congress.

floating" element in the power system which is analogous to a credit-system. Such an element should then be subject to fluctuations on a dimension of inflation-deflation, and be in need of controls for the system as a whole, at a level above that of the activities of particular units.

The analogue of inflation seems to me to touch the credibility of the assertion of the bindingness of obligations assumed. Power, as a symbolic medium, is like money in that it is itself "worthless," but is accepted in the expectation that it can later be "cashed in," this time in the activation of binding obligations. If, however, "power-credit" has been extended too far, without the necessary organizational basis for fulfillment of expectations having been laid, then attempting to invoke the obligations will result in less than a full level of performance, inhibited by various sorts of resistance. In a collectivity undergoing disintegration the same formal office may be "worth less" than it otherwise would have been because of attrition of its basis of effectiveness. The same considerations hold when it is a case of overextension of new power-expectations without adequate provision for making them effective.

It goes without saying that a power-system in which this creditlike element is prominent is in a state analogous to the "insolvency" of a monetary system which includes an important element of actual credit, namely its commitments cannot be fulfilled all at once, even if those to whom they have been made have formally valid rights to such fulfillment. Only a strict zero-sum power system could fulfill this condition of "liquidity." Perhaps the conservatism of political ideologies makes it even more difficult to accept the legitimacy of such a situation—it is all too easy to define it as "dishonest"—than in the corresponding economic case.

There is, however, a fine line between solid, responsible and constructive political leadership which in fact commits the collectivity beyond its capacities for instantaneous fulfillment of all obligations, and reckless overextendedness, just as there is a fine line between responsible banking and "wild-catting."

Furthermore, under unusual pressures, even highly responsible leadership can be put in situations where a "deflationary" spiral sets in, in a pattern analogous to that of a financial panic. I interpret, for instance McCarthyism as such a deflationary spiral in the political field. The focus

of the commitments in which the widest extension had taken place was in the international field—the United States had very rapidly come into the position of bearing the largest share of responsibility for maintenance of world political order against an expansionist Communist movement. The "loss of China" was in certain quarters a particularly traumatic experience, and the Korean war a highly charged symbol of the costs of the new stewardship.

A pluralistic political system like the American always has a large body of latent claims on the loyalty of its citizens to their government, not only for the "right sentiments" but for "sacrifices," but equally these are expected to be invoked only in genuine emergencies. The McCarthy definition of the situation was, however, that virtually anyone in a position of significant responsibility should not only recognize the "in case" priority—not necessarily by our basic values the highest—of national loyalty, but should explicitly renounce all other loyalties which might conceivably compete with that to the nation, including those to kith and kin. This was in effect a demand to liquidate all other commitments in favor of the national, a demand which in the nature of the case could not be met without disastrous consequences in many different directions. It tended to "deflate" the power system by undermining the essential basis of trust on which the influence of many elements bearing formal and informal leadership responsibilities, and which in turn sustained "power-credit," necessarily rested. Perhaps the most striking case was the allegation of communist infiltration and hence widespread "disloyalty" in the army, which was exploited to try to force the army leadership to put the commitments of all associated personnel, including e.g. research scientists, in completely "liquid" form. Two features of the McCarthy movement particularly mark it as a deflationary spiral, first the vicious circle of spreading involvement with the casting of suspicion on wider and wider circles of otherwise presumptively loyal elements in the society and secondly the surprisingly abrupt end of the spiral once the "bubble was pricked" and "confidence restored," events associated particularly with the public reaction to McCarthy's performance in the televised army hearings, and to Senator Flanders' protest on the floor of the Senate.³⁹

³⁹ I have dealt with some aspects of the McCarthy episode in "Social Strains in America," *Structure and*

The focus of the McCarthy disturbance may be said to have been in the influence system, in the relation between integrative and pattern-maintenance functions in the society. The primary deflationary effect was on the "credit" elements of pluralistic loyalties. This in turn would make leadership elements, not only in government but private groups, much less willing to take risks in claiming loyalties which might compete with those to government. Since, however, in the hierarchy of control the influence system is superordinate to the power system, deflation in the former is necessarily propagated to the latter. This takes in the first instance the form of a rush to withdraw political support—which it will be remembered is here treated as a form of power—from leadership elements which could in any sense be suspected of "disloyalty." The extreme perhaps was the slogan propagated by McCarthy and played with by more responsible Republican leaders like Thomas E. Dewey, of "twenty years of treason" which impugned the loyalty of the Democratic Party as a whole. The effect was, by depriving opposition leadership of influence, to make it unsafe even to consider granting them power.

The breaking through of the zero-sum limitations of more elementary power systems opens the way to altogether new levels of collective effectiveness, but also, in the nature of the case, involves new levels of risk and uncertainty. I have already dealt briefly with this problem at the level of the particular collectivity and its extension of commitments. The problem of course is compounded for a system of collectivities because of the risk not only of particular failures, but of generalized inflationary and deflationary disturbances. There are, as we have noted, mechanisms of control which operate to regulate investment, and similarly extension of the commitments of particular collectivities, both of which have to do with the attempt to ensure responsibility, on the one hand for solvency over the long run, on the other for success of the larger "strategy" of extension. It is reasonable to suppose that beyond these, there must be mechanisms operating at the level of the system as a whole in both contexts.

In the monetary case it was the complex of central banking, credit management and their rela-

Process, op. cit., chapter 7, pp. 226-249. The inherent impossibility of the demand for "absolute security" in a pluralistic system is very cogently shown by Edward Shils in *The Torment of Secrecy* (New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1956), especially in chapter VI.

tions to governmental finance which has been seen to be the focus of these highest-level controls. In the case of power it is of course the first crucial point that there was to be some relatively paramount apex of control of the power and authority system, which we think of as in some sense the "sovereign" state.⁴⁰ This has mainly to do with the relations between what we have called justification and legitimacy, in relation to government as the highest-order tightly integrated collectivity structure—so far. This is the central focus of Weber's famous analysis of authority, but his analysis is in need of considerable extension in our sense. It seems, among other things, that he posed an unduly sharp alternative between charismatic and "routine" cases, particularly the rational-legal version of the latter. In particular it would be my view that very substantial possibilities of regulated extension of power-commitments exist within the framework of certain types of "legal" authority, especially where they are aspects of a political system which is pluralistic in general terms. These problems, however, cannot further be explored at the end of what is already a very long paper.

CONCLUSION

This paper has been designed as a general theoretical attack on the ancient problem of the nature of political power and its place, not only in political systems, narrowly conceived, but in the structure and processes of societies generally. The main point of reference for the attack has been the conception that the discussion of the problem in the main traditions of political thought have not been couched at a sufficiently rigorously analytical level, but have tended to treat the nation, the state, or the lower-level collectively organized "group," as the empirical object of reference, and to attempt to analyze its functioning without further basic analytical breakdown. The

⁴⁰ In saying this I am very far from maintaining that "absolute" sovereignty is an essential condition of the minimal integration of political systems. On the contrary, first it is far from absolute internally, precisely because of the pluralistic character of most modern political systems and because of the openness of their boundaries in the integrative economic and other directions. Externally the relation of the territorial unit to norms and values transcending it is crucial, and steadily becoming more so. See my paper "Polarization of the World and International Order" in Quincy Wright, William M. Evan and Morton Deutsch, eds., *Preventing World War III* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1962), pp. 310-331.

most conspicuous manifestation of this tendency has been the treatment of power.

The present paper takes a radically different position, cutting across the traditional lines. It takes its departure from the position of economic theory and, by inference, the asymmetry between it and the traditional political theory,⁴¹ which has treated one as the theory of an analytically defined functional system of society—the economy—and the other as a concrete substructure, usually identified with government. Gradually the possibility has opened out both the extension of the analytical model of economic theory to the political field and the direct articulation of political with economic theory within the logical framework of the theory of the social system as a whole, so that the *polity* could be conceived as a functional subsystem of the society in all its theoretical fundamentals parallel to the economy.

This perspective necessarily concentrated attention on the place of money in the conception of the economy. More than that, it became increasingly clear that money was essentially a "symbolic" phenomenon and hence that its analysis required a frame of reference closer to that of linguistics than of technology, i.e. it is not the intrinsic properties of gold which account for the value of money under a gold standard any more than it is the intrinsic properties of the sounds symbolized as "book" which account for the valuation of physically fixed dissertations in linguistic form. This is the perspective from which the conception of power as a *generalized symbolic medium* operating in the processes of social interaction has been set forth.

This paper has not included a survey of the empirical evidence bearing on its ramified field of problems, but my strong conviction is not only that the line of analysis adopted is consistent with the broad lines of the available empirical evidence, but that it has already shown that it can illuminate a range of empirical problems which were not well understood in terms of the more conventional theoretical positions—e.g. the reasons for the general egalitarian pressure in the evolution of the political franchise, or the nature of McCarthyism as a process of political deflationary spiral.

It does not seem necessary here to recapitulate the main outline of the argument. I may conclude with the three main points with which I began. I submit, first, that the analytical path

⁴¹ I myself once accepted this. Cf. *The Social System* (Illinois, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1951), chapter V, pp. 161-163.

entered upon here makes it possible to treat power in conceptually specific and precise terms and thus gets away from the theoretical diffuseness called to attention, in terms of which it has been necessary to include such a very wide variety of problematical phenomena as "forms" of power. Secondly, I think it can advance a valid claim to present a resolution of the old dilemma as to whether (in the older terms) power is "essentially" a phenomenon of coercion or of consensus. It is both, precisely because it is a phenomenon which integrates a plurality of factors and outputs of political effectiveness and is not to be identified with any one of them. Finally, light has been thrown on the famous zero-sum problem, and a definite position taken that, though under certain specific assumptions the zero-sum condition holds, these are not constitutive of power systems in general, but under different conditions systematic "extension" of power spheres without sacrifice of the power of other units is just as important a case.

These claims are put forward in full awareness that on one level there is an inherent arbitrariness in them, namely that I have defined power and a number of related concepts in my own way, which is different from many if not most of the definitions current in political theory. If theory were a matter only of the arbitrary choice of definitions and assumptions and reasoning from there, it might be permissible to leave the question at that and say simply, this is only one more personal "point of view." Any claim that it is more than that rests on the conception that the scientific understanding of societies is arrived at through a gradually developing organon of theoretical analysis and empirical interpretation and verification. My most important contention is that the line of analysis presented here is a further development of a main line of theoretical analysis of the social system as a whole, and of verified interpretation of the empirical evidence presented to that body of theory. This body of theory must ultimately be judged by its outcomes both in theoretical generality and consistency, over the whole range of social system theory, and by its empirical validity, again on levels which include not only conventionally "political" references, but their empirical interrelations with all other aspects of the modern complex society looked at as a whole.

TECHNICAL NOTE


The above analysis has been presented in wholly discursive terms. Many decisions about categorization and detailed steps of analysis were, how-

ever, referred to a formalized paradigm of the principal structural components and process categories and relations of a society considered as a social system. For the benefit of readers with more technical interests in social system theory it has seemed advisable to present a very brief outline of the most directly relevant parts of the general paradigm here, with a brief elucidation of its relevance to the above discussion.⁴²

The structural reference points are essentially two, namely first that at a sufficiently high level of differentiation of a society, economy, polity and integrative system become empirically distinct in terms of the primacy of function of structural units e.g. there is an important structural difference between a private business firm, an administrative agency of government and a court of law. Secondly every such unit is involved in plural interchange relations with other units with respect to most of its functional requirements from its situation—i.e., for factor inputs—and the conditions of making its contributions to other units in the “division of labor”—i.e., disposal of “product” outputs. This order of differentiation requires *double* interchanges between all the structural components belonging to each category-pair, e.g. firms and households, firms and political agencies (not necessarily governmental, it should be remembered) etc. The double interchange situation precludes mediation of processes in terms either of ascriptive expectations or barter arrangements, or a combination of the two. It necessitates the development of generalized symbolic media, of which we have treated money, power, and influence as cases.

At a sufficiently high level of generalized development the “governing” interchanges (in the sense of cybernetic hierarchy) take place between the media which are anchored in the various functional subsystems—as power is anchored in the polity. These media in turn serve as instru-

⁴² The paradigm itself is still incomplete, and even in its present state has not been published as a whole. The first beginning statement dealing with process was made by Parsons and Smelser in *Economy and Society*, esp. Chapter II, and has been further developed in certain respects in Smelser's two subsequent independent books (*Social Change in the Industrial Revolution*, and *Theory of Collective Behavior*). In my own case certain aspects, which now need further revision, were published in the article “Pattern Variables Revisited” (*American Sociological Review*, August, 1960). Early and partial versions of application to political subject-matter are found in my contributions to Roland Young, ed., *Approaches to the Study of Politics*, and Burdick and Brodbeck, eds., *American Voting Behavior*.



mentalities of gaining control of “lower-order” resources which are necessary for fulfillment of expectations. Thus the expenditure of money for “goods” is not, at the system or “aggregate” level (as analyzed by Keynes), acquisition of the possession of particular commodities, but consists in the generalized expectation of availability of goods on “satisfactory” market terms. This is the primary output of the economy to consumers. Similarly, when we speak of control of productivity as a factor of effectiveness, it is not managerial control of particular plants which is meant, but control of a share of general productivity of the economy through market mechanisms, without specification of particulars.

The paradigm of interchange between general media of communication is presented in figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 simply designates the format in which this part of the paradigm is conceived. The assumptions of this format are three, none of which can be grounded or justified within the limits of the present exposition. These are (1) that the patterns of differentiation of a social system can be analyzed in terms of four primary functional categories, each of which is the focus of a primary functional subsystem of the society. As noted in the body of the essay, economy and polity are conceived to be such subsystems; (2) The primary interchange processes through which these subsystems are integrated with each other operate through generalized symbolic media of the type which I have assumed money and power to be,⁴³ and (3) at the level of differentiation of interest here, each interchange system is a double

⁴³ There is a very crucial problem area which concerns the nature of the interchanges between a society as a system in our sense and its environment. This set of problems unfortunately cannot be entered into here.


interchange, implying both the "alienation" of resources and products from their system of origin and the transcending of the barter level of exchange. Under these assumptions all figure 1 does is to portray a system of six double interchanges operating between each logically given pair among the four primary functional subsystems of a society. For convenience tentative names are given to each of these six double interchange systems.

Figure 2, then, places each of the six interchange systems on a horizontal axis, simply because they are easier to read that way. It adds

to figure 1 only by introducing names of categories, directions of flow and designations as to medium (money, power, etc.) for each of the four places in each of the six interchange systems, thus presenting twenty-four categories, each of the four basic media appearing in four "forms."

Among the six interchange sets, power as a medium is involved, by our analysis, in only three, namely the interchanges of the polity (G) with each of the other three. These are the system of "resource mobilization," *vis-à-vis* the economy, the support system which involves the input of political support and the output of decisions

FIGURE 2
THE CATEGORIES OF SOCIETAL INTERCHANGE



M = Money P = Power
 I = Influence C = Commitments
 1,2,3 = Order of hierarchical control as between media.
 a,b = Order of hierarchical control within interchange systems.
 "In" means Input of a category of resources to the subsystem indicated from the other member of the pair.
 "Out" means Output of a category of "product" from the indicated source to the relevant destination.
 Every double interchange consists of one input (factor) interchange and one output (product) interchange.

(*vis-à-vis* the integrative system) and the system of legitimation, as I have called it, *vis-à-vis* the value aspect of the pattern-maintenance system. The last of these three is a special case which does not involve power as a medium, but rather the structure of the code governing authority as defining the institutionalized uses of power, hence the legitimation of authority. Primary attention can thus be given to the other two.

The categories included in the *A-G* (economy-polity, or resource mobilization) interchange can be described as “forms” of power and of money (or wealth) respectively. They will be seen to be the categories which have been used in the appropriate parts of the discursive exposition of the body of the paper. The double interchange here, as in the classic economy—or labor-consumption case, involves first one factor-interchange, namely control of productivity as factor of effectiveness exchanged for opportunity for effectiveness (in the particular case of capital, as a factor of production). Productivity is a monetary factor because it is a pool of resources controlled through monetary funds—which of course in turn can be exchanged for the particular facilities needed, notably goods and services. Opportunity, however, is a form of power in the sense discussed.

The second part of the double interchange is one of “product” outputs. This takes place between commitment of services to organization—typically through employment—which I have interpreted to be a form of power, and the allocation of fluid resources to the purveyors of service as facilities essential to the performance of their obligations—typically the control of budgeted funds, though often generalization does not extend as high as this. Thus fluid resources in the ideal type case take the form of money funds.⁴⁴

The second primary interchange system, which for convenience I shall call the support system, is that between polity and integrative system (*G-I*), which latter involves the associational as-

pect of group structure and solidarity in relation to the system of norms (legal and informal)—as distinguished from values. The basic difference lies in the fact that power here is interchanged not with money but with influence, and that whereas *vis-à-vis* money it was the “controlling” medium, *vis-à-vis* influence it is controlled. This difference is symbolized by the placing of the power categories here in the outside positions whereas in the *A-G* case they were placed inside (as the monetary categories were in *L-A*).

The relevant factor interchange here is between policy decisions as a “factor of solidarity” and interest-demands as a factor of effectiveness, in the senses in which these concepts were used above. Essentially we may say that interest-demands “define the situation” for political decision-making—which of course is by no means to say that demands in their initial form are or should be simply “granted” without modification. Like other factors they are typically transformed in the course of the political process. Correspondingly policy decisions are a factor in solidarity in that they constitute commitments for collective action on which “interested parties” within limits can count.

The interchange of “product” outputs then consists of leadership responsibility as output of the polity (a form of influence, note, *not* of power), and political support as an output of the “associational” system—in the governmental case e.g. the electorate, which is a source of the political “income” of power. It will of course be noted that the units involved in any particular case of these two interchanges typically are not the same—thus party leaders may bid for support whereas administrative officials make certain policy decisions. This type of “split” (carried out to varying degrees) is characteristic of any highly differentiated system.

Figure 3 attempts to look at the generalized media from the point of view not only of their hierarchical ordering, but of the relation between the code and message components, and the position of the latter as sanctions controlling on the one hand factors essential to the various functional subsystems, on the other hand product outputs from these subsystems. The rows are arranged from top to bottom in terms of the familiar hierarchy of control—each row designating one of the four media. The columns, on the other hand, designate components into which each medium needs to be broken down if some of the basic con-

⁴⁴ The process of investment, which I conceive to be one very important special case of the operation of this interchange system, seems to work in such a way that the power component of a loan is a grant of opportunity, through which an increment of otherwise unavailable control of productivity is gained. The recipient of this “grant” is then, through committing (individual or collective) services, in a position to utilize these resources for increasing future economic productivity in some way. This is a special case because the resources might be used in some other way, e.g. for relieving distress or for scientific research.

FIGURE 3
THE MEDIA AS SANCTIONS

COMPONENTS OF MEDIA AND INTERCHANGE RECIPROCALLS		CODES		MESSAGES (SANCTIONS)		TYPES OF SANCTION AND OF EFFECT
		VALUE - PRINCIPLE	COORDINATION STANDARD	FACTORS CONTROLLED	PRODUCTS CONTROLLED	
MEDIA IN HIERARCHY OF CONTROL	L					
	COMMITMENTS	INTEGRITY	PATTERN-CONSISTENCY	WAGES JUSTIFICATION OF LOYALTIES	CONSUMERS' DEMAND CLAIMS TO LOYALTIES	NEGATIVE - INTENTIONAL (ACTIVATION OF COMMITMENTS)
	I					
	INFLUENCE	SOLIDARITY	CONSENSUS	COMMITMENTS TO VALUED ASSOCIATION POLICY DECISIONS	COMMITMENT TO COMMON VALUES POLITICAL SUPPORT	POSITIVE - INTENTIONAL (PERSUASION)
G						
POWER	EFFECTIVENESS	SUCCESS	INTEREST-DEMANDS CONTROL OF PRODUCTIVITY	LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBILITY CONTROL OF FLUID RESOURCES	NEGATIVE - SITUATIONAL (SECURING COMPLIANCE)	
A						
MONEY	UTILITY	SOLVENCY	CAPITAL LABOR	COMMITMENT OF SERVICES EXPECTATION OF GOODS	POSITIVE - SITUATIONAL (INDUCEMENT)	

ditions of its operation in mediating interaction are to be understood.

In the body of the paper I have discussed the reasons for which it seems necessary to distinguish two components in the code aspect of each medium, namely what have been called the relevant value principle on the one hand, the "coordinative standard" on the other. The most familiar example concerns the paradigmatic economic case. Here the famous concept of utility seems to be the relevant value principle whereas that of solvency is the coordinative standard. Utility is the basic "measure" of value in the economic sense, whereas the imperative to maintain solvency is a category of norm for the guidance of units in economic action. For the political case I have adopted the concept of effectiveness in Barnard's sense as the parallel to the economist's utility. Success, for the unit in question, notably the collective ease, seems to be the best available term for the corresponding coordinative standard. (Possibly, used with proper qualifications, the term sovereignty might be still more appropriate for this standard.)

At the other most important direct boundary of the polity, solidarity in Durkheim's sense seems to be the value-principle of integration which is parallel to utility and effectiveness, whereas the very important (to political theory) concept of *consensus* seems adequately to formulate the relevant integrative coordinative standard. Since they are not directly involved in the interchange systems of immediate concern here, I merely call attention to the designation of the value-principle of the pattern-maintenance system as *integrity* and the corresponding coordinative standard as *pattern-consistency*.

The *A* and *G* columns of figure 3 then designate contexts of operation of each of the four media as sanctions, but arranged not by interchange system as in figure 2, but by control of factor inputs and product outputs respectively. Thus money though not itself a factor of production, "controls," i.e. buys, labor and capital as the primary factors, in the *A-L* and the *A-G* interchange systems respectively, whereas for "consuming" systems money buys outputs of the economy, namely goods (in *A-L*) and services (in *A-G*) respectively.

The involvement of power is conceived to be parallel. On the one hand it "commands" the two primary mobile factors of effectiveness, namely control of productivity (in *G-A*) and interest-demands (in *G-I*) (as justified in terms of appeal to norms). On the other hand the "consumers" or beneficiaries of the outputs from the process can use power to command these outputs in the form of fluid resources (e.g. through budget allocation in *G-A*) and of leadership responsibility for valued goals (in *G-I*).

It will be noted that in figure 3 negative and positive sanction types alternate in the hierarchy of control. Power, as the medium depending on negative situational sanctions is "sandwiched" between money (below it) with its positive situational sanctions and influence (above it) with its positive intentional sanctions.

Returning to figure 2, power is also involved in the legitimation system (*L-G*), but this time as code, as aspect of authority. This may be conceived as a mechanism for linking the principles and standards in the *L* and *G* rows. What is called the assumption of operative responsibility (*P3a*), which is treated as a "factor of integrity" is responsibility for *success* in the implementation of the value-principles, not only of collective effectiveness, but of integrity of the paramount societal value-pattern. It may be said that the legitimation of authority (*C3a*) "imposes" the responsibility to attempt such success. Legality of the powers of office on the other hand (*P3c*), as a category of output to the polity, is an application of the standard of pattern-consistency. At the various relevant levels action may and should be taken consistent with the value-commitments. In exchange for legal authorization to take such action, the responsible office-holder must accept moral responsibility for his use of power and his decisions of interpretation (*C3b*).